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Abstract 
The way communities build resiliency and prepare for acts of terrorism is ambiguous in 
the United States; best practices remain unclear. Due to mobility and advancements in 
communication technologies, individuals and organizations share information, incite 
anger, recruit, and act on ideological grievances with ease. Such grievances are bolstered 
by the political and social exclusion of disparate groups through poorly designed policies 
and ineffective government structures. Using a combination of social constructivism and 
systems thinking theories, this case study explored collaboration efforts between 
government agencies and nongovernment experts in Oklahoma City, OK, identifying best 
practices as a result of lessons learned following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building. Data were acquired through public records related to the 
bombing, combined with a qualitative survey of 31 community leaders.  These data were 
inductively coded and subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. Key findings indicate 
that while open communication with the community and increased coordination were 
suggested by participants, reports were kept internal to each agency and not widely 
shared or implemented effectively across the community. Sharing the identified best 
practices and acknowledging collaboration opportunities promotes positive social change 
by involving the broader community and building early resiliency to address ideologic 
grievances and create more effective community counterterrorism plans. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The way communities build resiliency and prepare for acts of terrorism is 
relatively ambiguous in the United States and best practices remain unclear. Due to 
increased mobility and advancements in communication technologies, individuals and 
organizations have the ability to share grievances, incite anger, recruit followers, and act 
upon ideological grievances with greater ease (Smith, Burke, de Leiuen, and Jackson, 
2016). Many of these grievances are fueled by perceptions of social and ideological 
isolation from their community (Gewirtz and Baer, 1958; de Roy van Zuijdewijn and 
Bakker, 2016; Kailemia, 2016). Such grievances are often bolstered through the political 
and social exclusion of disparate groups due to poorly designed legislative policies and 
ineffective government structures (Akram, and Karmely, 2005; Levine, Leenman, 
Gershenson, and Hureau, 2014; Oberman, 2017). Policy makers at the community level 
often do not have the expertise regarding ideological disparities to understand which 
policies and structures have been detrimental to different communities.  Furthermore, this 
lack of expertise can then impact policy makers’ abilities to recommend changes within 
existing public service frameworks. 
Collaboration between government and nongovernmental experts improves 
knowledge bases and helps government agencies create more cohesive policies and more 
hospitable social structures. In this way, collaboration potentially reduces the level of 
ideological grievances in disparate communities. Exploring the collaborative efforts 
between governmental agencies and nongovernment organizations can help researchers 
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identify best practices and proven solutions to address knowledge deficits within 
government agencies. 
In Chapter 1, I provide a brief background concerning the current terrorism threat 
in the United States followed by an explanation of why terrorism is a problem worth 
studying at this time. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of how a U.S. community responded to an act of domestic 
terrorism and how that event influenced collaboration efforts between governmental 
agencies (emergency responders) and nongovernment organizations (educational 
institutes, religious institutes, specialty think tanks, and aid organizations) as they design 
and implement community level counterterrorism strategies. The research questions and 
theoretical foundations provided a framework for understanding the level of current 
collaboration and potential gaps in community security planning efforts. I provide 
definitions in Chapter 1 for concepts, phrases and words that are specific to terrorism 
research and crisis management practices. Despite assumptions and identified limitations 
inherent in the narrow scope of the study, the significance of the study is validated by the 
ongoing threat of terrorist activity and the amount of newly identified data regarding 
ideological and social grievances that have underpinned motivations to commit acts of 
terrorism. 
Background 
The threat of domestic terrorism is an ongoing national security issue for the 
United States (U.S.). Traditionally terrorism has been a U.S. Foreign Policy issue, 
addressed through a combination of diplomacy and military force. In the last few 
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decades, the U.S. has been forced to change its view and its approach to international and 
domestic terrorism threats to maintain national security and public safety. With the 1993 
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, Americans were faced with 
the realization that terrorism was not only a foreign problem. Yet, for most Americans 
living outside of New York City, the personal safety threat did not seem plausible. The 
1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, considered at the time to be the worst terrorist attack on 
U.S. soil, changed that view. The attack on a Midwestern, midsized U.S. city, conducted 
by American citizens, was something new, unexpected, and unimaginable. In the years 
following the Oklahoma City attack, terrorist’s groups continued to target U.S. interests 
around the world. Once again, such attacks were thought to occur far away from the 
average American home and had very little impact on Americans’ daily lives. Without 
the immediate threat to personal safety, most Americans went back to their day to day 
activities without much thought or concern regarding local threats of terrorism. 
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were a 
second terrorism awakening for U.S. citizens, and a defining moment for U.S. counter-
terrorism policy. With the assistance of public television and cable news networks, the 
attacks were broadcast for weeks following the event. Moment by moment coverage of 
the rescue and recovery efforts captured the attention of viewers worldwide and allowed 
the emotional build up to influence the national security and foreign policy decisions that 
were made in the decade following the attack. Between 2001 and 2017, researchers and 
policy makers worked diligently to find a balance between ensuring national security and 
maintaining the privacy rights of U.S. citizens. Over the last sixteen years, law 
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enforcement and policy makers have had some success and some failure in dealing with 
U.S. terrorist threats and attacks. Recent terrorism events in California, Florida, New 
York, and Las Vegas reinforce the reality of the existing domestic threat and the fact that 
ideological grievances and terrorism remains a complicated issue to understand and to 
address. 
Global terrorism has become a hot national security topic receiving a great deal of 
mass media attention, academic research dollars, and the consideration of global leaders 
(Lutz, Lutz, and Lutz, 2013). In the wake of multiple terrorist attacks across Europe and 
Central Asia, the U.S. Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human 
Rights Sarah Sewall, stated “Tackling violent extremism isn't a question of government 
on the one hand, and people on the other. We need both hands - people and government - 
working in partnership to meet this challenge. Violent extremists want to sow fear, to 
divide, and to provoke overreactions that feed the cycle of bloodshed on which they 
thrive. They see only the lines that separate us and not the profound ties that bind us 
together” (Speech in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 30 March 2016). 
With a rise in terrorist activity in Europe, Central Asia, and Northern Africa, 
America’s attention has been focused overseas and on foreign born terrorist threats. 
However, the threat of domestic terrorism is a valid concern for U.S. communities. The 
2013 Boston Marathon bombing, the 2015 San Bernardino attack, the 2016 attack on a 
Florida nightclub, the 2017 attack on concert goers in Las Vegas, various attacks on 
military bases and military recruitment offices, as well as individual attacks on college 
campuses, movie theaters, and workplaces in the U.S., are all reminders that Americans 
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must not become complacent with regards to preparing for domestic terrorist events, 
including addressing the aftermath of a terrorist attack (Sobel, 2014; Bjelopera, 2013, 
2014). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) admits there is a lot of work to be 
done and many communities remain unprepared for the crisis response challenges that 
New York, Washington DC, Boston, and Orlando experienced during and shortly after 
the terrorist attacks (DHS, 2016). For many communities in the U.S. the question is not 
whether they should prepare, but how to prepare. 
Terrorism research spans a wide range of topics and academic disciplines, from 
the psychological impact terrorism has on victims to the economic and social impacts 
terrorism has on the community (Weinberg, Gil, and Gilbar, 2014; Schneider, Brück and 
Meierrieks, 2015). Past, present, and the threat of future acts of terrorism have been used 
indiscriminately by television news programs to increase viewership; by journalists and 
writers to increase readership; by academics and think tanks to validate research grants; 
by private companies to sell security equipment or protective services; by film makers to 
increase box office sales; and by politicians and law enforcement agencies to validate the 
extension of national security measures. Despite the various ways terrorism has been 
portrayed, it is the psychological effect, the fear of becoming a victim, which has had the 
most detrimental impact on American communities (Schmid, 2013; Bjelopera, 2013; 
2014; Hewitt, 2014). 
This case study presents an in-depth examination of Oklahoma City prior to, 
during, and in the aftermath of a domestic terrorist attack. I do so to determine how the 
attack in 1995 has shaped the city’s preparation and response planning efforts regarding 
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the threat of terrorism today. Knowledge gained through this examination promotes 
positive social change by identifying lessons learned and best practices following a 
domestic terrorism event. Results of the study promote more detailed planning and 
encourage a wider range of community collaboration with experts to provide additional 
training and advice regarding ideological grievances and community level counter-
terrorism strategies (Stewart, and Vocino, 2013). For the rest of Chapter 1, I provide a 
short synopsis of the existing literature surrounding the phenomenon of terrorism and 
begin to outline why terrorism response strategies need to be addressed at the community 
level rather than being left to state and national security regimes. I will provide a more 
detailed review of the current state of terrorism research and the integration of 
community response research in Chapter 2. 
Problem Statement 
Extensive research, unprecedented security measures, ongoing military 
operations, and an unimaginable amount of money have been invested in addressing 
ideological violence, yet the threat remains and continues to grow. Identifying and 
addressing the underlying motivations that drive individuals and organizations to commit 
acts of terrorism is inherently complex. Due to this complexity and the urgency related to 
finding a suitable security solution, counterterrorism strategies need to be designed and 
implemented at the community level. 
Social unrest around the world combined with increased access to global 
communication networks have expanded the recruitment and coordination efforts of 
terrorist organizations, making it easier to reach potential followers and hide illicit 
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activities on a global scale (Matusitz, 2013; Milosevska, 2013). Data collected by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
along with recent security warnings issued by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), indicate that terrorism remains a significant threat to U.S. communities (START, 
2015; DHS, 2015). The psychological impact, the potential for social disruption, and the 
financial burden of increased security measures in response to terrorist threats, has and 
will continue to impact every American community (Dragu and Polborn, 2014; Moteff, 
2015). Despite a long list of terrorist plots and the multitude of terrorist acts that have 
been carried out around the world, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center in New York City, (a symbol of U.S. financial strength), and the concurrent 
attack on the Pentagon in Washington D.C., (a symbol of U.S. military strength), changed 
the American mindset and renewed awareness regarding the threat of terrorism. The 
extent of the death toll combined with the significance of the targets, amplified the 
publicity the attack received around the world and reminded Americans that they were 
not immune to the growing insurgency of global terror. In the months and years 
following September 11, 2001, U.S. political leaders commissioned the formation of a 
centralized department to oversee and coordinate national security resources in what was 
defined and validated as a War on Terrorism. 
On November 25, 2002, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
established, bringing 22 government agencies under one centralized authority to address 
the threat of domestic terrorism (Law, 2002). In the following years, similar counter-
terrorism centers were established by U.S. state governments to assist with the 
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coordination and dissemination of state resources. Although the domestic threat of 
terrorism seemed new after September 11, 2001, terrorism concerns and counterterrorism 
planning had been ongoing in many U.S. communities. Since the early 1990s a great deal 
of time and money has been spent on gathering intelligence and funding law enforcement 
activities to address the growing threat of domestic terrorism and to maintain a sense of 
national security (Taylor and Swanson, 2015). The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was a 
reminder that even small midwestern communities were at risk of becoming victims of 
terrorism. First responders and emergency personel reacted according to existing 
emergency plans, however it appeared that government leaders were not prepared for the 
community anxiety and anger that followed (Tucker, Pfefferbaum, Nitiema, Wendling, 
and Brown, 2016; Pfefferbaum, Nitiema, Pfefferbaum, Houston, Tuck, Jeon-Slaughter, 
and North, 2016).  
Despite over 20 years of community planning and the construction of a 
counterterrorism research center in Oklahoma City, fully implementing a strong 
counterterrorism program has been challenging. In the hours, days, and months following 
the Oklahoma City Bombing, several organizations came together to provide emergency 
response services, communications support, search and recovery, medical and mental 
health services, and food and shelter for the victims. The community leaders and 
surrounding cities continued their support and collaboration efforts as funds and 
community interests permitted. Unfortunately as the years passed, community interests 
and funding for special programs diminished. One example isThe Memorial Institute for 
the Prevention of Terrorism that was created after the bombing in 1995. In the early years 
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the Memorial Institute was considered the premire U.S. counter terrorism research center, 
yet the center lost most of its funding and was eventually closed in August of 2014. This 
trend was not uncommon despite the growing threat of terrorism, public funding and 
donations have been shown to follow the latest or most prominent event and therefore as 
new terrorist attacks occurred over the years, counterterrorism funding dollars transfered 
from community to community, with very few longterm community programs surviving. 
Despite the inconsistent flow of counterterrorism funding, building community 
cohesion, public trust, and longterm resiliency remains a concern for many local 
community leaders. In response to growing uncertainty surrounding the threat of 
terrorism, community leaders continue to look for ways to design effective and efficient 
strategies to prevent, respond and overcome future acts of terrorism (GAO, 2015). Recent 
research recommends additional collaboration with local nongovernmental organizations, 
religious organizations, and university research centers (McGinty, Sziarto and Seymour-
Jorn 2013; Cheema, Scheyven, Glavovic and Imran, 2014). A large body of research 
exists regarding the causes of terrorism and what is being done at the national and state 
level to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks, however a gap remains in the literature 
regarding what has been and is being done at the local community level. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of 
how U.S. communities respond to an act of domestic terrorism and to determine what 
collaboration efforts between governmental agencies (leaders, first responders) and 
nongovernment organizations (educational institutes, religious institutes, specialty think 
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tanks, and aid organizations) are needed to design and implement community level 
counterterrorism strategies.  
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), established by START and the Global 
Terrorism Index (GTI) developed by the Institute for Economics & Peace, both indicate 
that ideological violence and ideologically based warfare remain a significant threat to 
U.S. national security and overall global stability. In this case study, I evaluated the 
effectiveness of such collaborative programs by exploring the personal experiences and 
perceptions of government and nongovernmental leaders in Oklahoma City who have 
been commissioned or have volunteered to plan for and address security concerns 
associated with an emergency event such as an act of terrorism. Oklahoma City was 
chosen for this study due to its first-hand experience with responding to and recovering 
from a domestic terrorist attack in 1995. Sharing the identified best practices and 
acknowledging the potential opportunities for improvement may promote positive social 
change by assisting other communities as they build resiliency against ideologic 
grievances and create their own community terrorism response plans. 
Outcomes of the study include providing insight regarding which collaboration 
activities have influenced the effectiveness and efficiency of community-based 
counterterrorism strategies, and which lessons learned have been used to improved 
current counterterrorism strategies. The knowledge gained through this study may be 
used by leaders in other communities as they research, develop, and implement their own 
counterterrorism strategies. Best practices identified by this study may also encourage 
expanding collaboration efforts between all sectors of the community to address threats 
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of domestic terrorism and to promote community resiliency in the hope of reducing the 
long-term impact of future terrorist acts. 
Research Questions 
This study addresses the following question and sub questions.  
Question 
In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and 
nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint 
counter terrorism services? 
Sub questions 
1. What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organization 
provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address 
ideologically based security threats? 
2. In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment 
agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multicultural 
and multilingual needs? 
Theoretical Framework 
The framework chosen for this study was a combination of Berger’s and 
Luckman’s social constructivism, and Senge’s systems thinking theory. Social 
constructivism as interpreted by Berger’s and Luckman (1966), posits that humans have 
the ability to create their own systems of meaning in which they are able to understand 
their world through individual experiences and respond in accordance with their own 
interpretation of a shared event (Babbie, 2015). Social constructivism was an appropriate 
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theory to be used within this case study as a framework for explaining interpretations of 
an event from the perspective of the individuals who either experienced it first hand or 
those who have been tasked to provide services in the aftermath of the event. In addition 
to social constructivism, systems thinking theory, based on Senge’s interpretation, was 
also chosen as a framework for interpreting this case study to address the fact that 
communities are comprised of a network of intra and inter dependent systems (people, 
organizations, laws, and resources) working together to achieve a specific objective 
(Senge, 2006). Systems theory has been used in multiple disciplines to describe the 
interactions and dependencies of different agents within the system and helped bring 
together the individual interpretations of participants with the networked responsibilities 
inherent in comprehensive community counter-terrorism plans.  
Yin (2014) recommends using case studies to allow the researcher flexible 
collection and interpretation options that assist in developing a broader understanding of 
the phenomenon being studied. Conceptual frameworks promote an inductive approach 
rather than a narrower formal framework designed explicitly to test an existing theory 
(Anfara and Mertz, 2014). Social constructivism has been used by terrorism and 
counterterrorism researchers to develop an understanding of an individual’s 
interpretations and responses to their environment, as well as the social exchanges that 
take place within social and cultural experiences (Kayser, 2015; Resnick, Guimond, 
Wellman, Resnick, 2015). Combining elements of the two theoretical foundations into a 
social systems theoretical framework for research has been used successfully by Cavallo 
(2014) to examine community interactions within the context of disaster preparedness 
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planning and within Carter’s (2011) study of human behavior within social environments. 
Cavallo and Carter used social systems frameworks to describe the social interactions 
among individuals and others in a community setting similar to the community chosen 
for the proposed case study on Oklahoma City. The social systems framework 
successfully explored interactions between individuals and provided insight into the 
manner in which individuals behave within systems and both Cavallo and Carter 
concluded that choosing the combined theoretical frameworks provided unique insights 
into the behaviors that allowed the various members of their chosen communities to 
coexist. I used a similar framework for this study to shed light on how members of 
Oklahoma City have coexisted and how service agencies have interacted since the 1995 
terrorist event (Cavallo, 2014; Carter, 2011). 
In conducting this research, I also considered similar theoretical models such as 
structural functionalism and conflict theory based on a review of Dale's, Potts' and 
Vella’s (2015) analysis that explored elements of sustainability planning, Friedman’s 
(2014) study examining social class and cultures within global systems, and Bartolucci’s 
and Gallo’s (2015) terrorism study, for their similarities to the topic and research 
questions proposed in this study. However, structural functionalism and conflict theory 
were both rejected due to complexity in study design and the existence of research 
methodologies that constrained flexible collection and data interpretation. I constructed 
the primary and sub research questions within this case study to broadly explore the 
effectiveness and efficiency within community processes as determined by the 
participants. A broader social systems thinking approach, similar to processes used by 
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Alam and Husband (2013) and Barile and Saviano (2011) was needed to allow for the 
inclusion of individual interpretations, organizational structures and processes, and legal 
and policy limitations, as well as to explore the impact of available resources and time 
constraints that have a significant impact on the effectiveness or efficiency of the 
response and recovery processes chosen. 
Nature of the Study 
The study followed a qualitative model using a case study research process to 
explore the community response and recovery efforts prior to, during, and following the 
1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. There are several valid reasons for choosing this 
approach. Maxwell (2013) describes five goals that qualitative research is used to 
address: (a.) understanding the meaning of events, situations, experiences, and actions 
that study participants are involved with or engaged in, (b.) understanding the particular 
contexts within which the participants act and the influence that this context has on their 
actions, (c.) understanding the process by which events and actions take place, (d.) 
identifying unanticipated phenomena and influences, and generating new, "grounded" 
theories about the later, and (e.) developing causal explanations to tie the research 
together. Based on Maxwell’s description of the qualitative research method, I focused on 
methods designed to explore the 1995 bombing event and identify strategies used to 
address threats of terrorism, improve public safety, coordinate response, recover, and 
build long-term community resiliency in the future. 
A qualitative case study is consistent with investigating how government and 
nongovernmental leaders interpret, interact and engage in the preparation and 
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implementation of a community’s terrorism response and recovery plan. To ensure a 
rigorous approach to the case study framework, I conducted a process of data 
triangulation was to ensure data was collected from multiple sources and that such data 
captured individual interpretations of the event spanning twenty years from 1995 to 2015. 
I recorded data using a thick description research process to ensure that data were 
interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible. In addition, I 
conducted an audit trail to ensure that sources of data were mapped chronologically and 
could be revisited and reevaluated within the context of new information or contradictory 
data. Additionally, I implemented a researcher and peer review process periodically 
throughout the project to maintain my awareness as a researcher and manage my 
reflexivity to minimize any research biases. (Houghton, Casey, Shaw and Murphy, 2013; 
Anfara and Mertz, 2014; Almutairi, Gardner and McCarthy, 2014; Yin, 2014).  
Definitions 
The study of terrorism and its impact on U.S. communities is dynamic and 
continuously evolving in response to global research findings. It is necessary to define 
uncommon words, phrases and concepts that will be referred to within the literature used 
and the interpretation of the data within this study. The following definitions are not all 
inclusive; they have been determined to be the most significant concepts within the study 
as they pertain to U.S. communities, terrorism studies, emergency response and 
community resiliency planning. 
Community cohesion: A situation in which various groups work together to 
enhance the quality of life within a community.  These groups could include governing 
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bodies, public service agencies, private corporations, nongovernmental organizations 
(like educational or religious institutes and community services organizations), and 
private citizens (Cowden and Singh, 2014; Lewis and Craig, 2014; Martin, 2015; Seville, 
Van Opstal, and Vargo, 2015). 
Cultural assimilation: The ability of a community to invite, recognize and 
appreciate the cultural, ethnical, and linguistic diversity of its community members while 
urging members of the community to assimilate, take ownership of, and become active 
participants within their community. (Martin, 2015; Basuchoudhary, and Cotting, 2014).  
Ideology: A system of beliefs, principles and doctrine that provides guidance to 
an individual, group, social movement, or institution (Johnson, 2015; Bershady, 2014).  
Ideological Violence: The use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence 
by a group or individual to promote the group or individual’s political, religious, or social 
beliefs Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak, and Greilich, 2014). 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): A psychiatric disorder that can occur in 
people who have experienced or witnessed a traumatic event such as a natural disaster, a 
serious accident, a terrorist act, war/combat, rape or other violent personal assault 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2015). 
Political ideology: Motivation determined by political drivers or values which 
have often been defined along a liberal to conservative spectrum with respect to public 
policy issues (Iyer, Webster, Hornsey, and Vanman, 2014; Feldman and Johnston, 2014; 
Piazza, 2013).  
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Religious ideology: Motivation determined by religious drivers or values which 
determines acceptable societal norms and acceptable personal behaviors (Perry and 
Minteh, 2014; Turner, 2014).  
Resilience: The ability of a system to return to an equilibrium or steady state after 
a disturbance, such as a natural disaster (e.g. earthquake or flood) or a social upheaval 
(e.g. a terrorist attack, war, or revolution) (Vale, 2014; Vos, M. and Ohman, S., 2014; 
Cote and Nightingale, 2012, Brown and Westaway, 2011). 
Social disruption: The alteration or breakdown of traditional social life, the 
disruption of common social activities and community behavioral patterns due to an 
unexpected event or significant tragedy. (Aijazi, and Panjwani, 2015).  
Terrorism: An unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the 
furtherance of political or social objectives (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015). 
Additional context regarding how terrorism is defined will be provided within chapter 
two. 
Assumptions 
Determining that this study would be of value to other community, state, and 
national leaders required that I make a few initial assumptions about the intended 
audiences and the available data. The first assumption was that community, state, and 
national leaders perceived that the threat of a terrorist attack on a U.S. city exists. The 
second assumption was that appointed leaders have determined the threat is significant 
enough to warrant having community level strategic response plans in place. The third 
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assumption was that appointed leaders have engaged in an effort to develop a strategy, 
independently by agency or collectively as a community. The final assumption was that 
the resources required for a community level plan have been resourced and made 
available prior to a terrorist attack. 
Scope and Delimitations 
This case study was confined to the official boundaries of Oklahoma City, OK 
and did not include subsidiary communities in the surrounding area. Data related to 
government participants only included publicly available historic data and information 
provided through participant surveys and interviews directly related to the actions of city 
officials, law enforcement, emergency services leaders, and social service agencies 
within the scope of their official duties. Data related to the actions of nongovernment 
participants was include for those organizations which provided a critical service within 
the city’s strategic response plan (e.g. medical support, food and shelter, community 
education, or victim advocacy). 
Limitations 
The most significant limitation of this study was that it is focused on a single 
Midwestern community with a population of approximately 500,000; potentially limiting 
the transferability of the results to other communities. The case study’s qualitative design 
and structured data collection methodology only focused on publicly accessible data 
between 1995 and 2015, and on the personal accounts of voluntary study participants, 
limiting data sources to only information that was adequately recorded, made publicly 
available, or voluntarily provided. The third limitation was that the available historic 
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records, personal accounts, and written documentaries may have reflected personal or 
professional biases driven by the recording methodology (e.g. government reporting 
requirements, media agenda, book editorial process, or academic purposes). The final 
limitation of this study, as is the case for all research, was my personal biases and 
mannerisms as the researcher, which unintentionally influenced how the data was 
collected, the sources of data chosen for examination, and determined how the data was 
coded and interpreted. 
Significance of the Study 
This research may help fill a gap in our understanding related to how community 
leaders have used the institutional knowledge and existing resources possessed by 
government agencies and nongovernment organizations to meet the needs of the 
community before, during and after a terrorist attack. This research study was unique due 
to its focus on the personal experiences and perceptions of government and 
nongovernmental leaders that were directly involved in responding to a domestic terrorist 
attack. Furthermore, I sought participants’ subsequent reflections over the past twenty-
two years regarding how the community planned for, implemented their crisis action plan 
and how the community recovered from a terrorist attack. I used data collected through 
available public records, existing academic studies, historic media reports, and personal 
documentaries of the event. Additionally, I surveyed voluntary participants to determine 
how government leaders have or have not sought nongovernmental assistance and to 
discern what value collaboration with nongovernmental organizations brought prior to, 
during, and after a terrorist attack. The results of this study provide insights into the 
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collaborative processes that government leaders have used to engage across agencies and 
across nongovernmental organizations and may provide additional feedback to determine 
if nongovernmental organizations can provide additional resources and specialized 
assistance prior to, during, and after a terrorist attack. Insights from this study may help 
appointed leaders determine if similar programs should continue and how much 
additional resources should be invested in these types of programs based on current 
terrorism threats. 
Summary 
September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon in Washington 
DC reinvigorated how Americans viewed terrorism and how they defined, interpreted, 
and addressed their personal safety concerns. Although foreign terrorism on U.S. soil was 
somewhat of a new concept in 2001, acts of domestic terrorism frequently touch U.S. 
communities. Traditionally, domestic terrorism received far less publicity in national and 
global mass media until recently, the impact on U.S. communities has been devastating. 
Ongoing global security trends and terrorism research suggests the threat will continue to 
plague U.S. communities well into the future. In this case, study, I explored one 
community’s preparation and response to the 1995 bombing attack on the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK and examined how the city has reflected 
on and addressed the aftermath of that event. To develop a basic understanding of 
terrorism and how other societies have responded to the threat or recovered from acts of 
terrorism. Chapter 2 is a comprehensive review of the existing research and literature 
surrounding these topics. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been investing in extensive 
counterterrorism research, policy makers have implemented unprecedented security 
measures, funded continual military operations and spent an unimaginable amount of 
money addressing terrorism; yet the threat remains and continues to grow (Hoffman, and 
Strindberg, 2015; and Harmon, 2013). International leaders and scholars have 
acknowledged that social unrest and weak governance around the world combined with 
access to global communication networks have expanded the recruitment and 
coordination efforts of terrorist organizations, making it nearly impossible to track 
potential followers and stop terrorists’ activities completely. Despite this dire state of 
global affairs, researchers around the world are making a significant effort to not only 
study the causes of terrorism but a wealth of literature has been dedicated to prevention 
of terrorism through the implementation of programs designed to build resilient and 
responsive communities. The knowledge gained through ongoing research will continue 
to provide insight to government leaders that they can in turn use to create more effective 
and efficient counter-terrorism strategies at the various levels of government. Chapter 2 
provides a review of the existing literature within the field of terrorism and counter 
terrorism research. In this chapter, I describe the current state of terrorism research, 
identifies historic patterns related to terrorism and explains how research has changed 
since the 2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon. I organized the literature 
review using a framework established by McAllister and Schmid in the London:  
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Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (2013) beginning with agent-based terrorism 
research and ends with notable counter-terrorism research.  
Literature Search Strategy 
 The literature review process began with a brainstorming technique suggested by 
Creswell (2013) to create a mind map of relevant terms for studying terrorism. Based on 
previous academic and professional knowledge, I narrowed the themes to those that I 
believed would be critical for understanding how terrorism and counter-terrorism had 
been defined and how acts of terrorism and the threat of terrorism are being addressed 
within counter-terrorism strategies (Tinnes, 2013). I grouped general themes into 
categories within a literature review database. Focusing on each category, I conducted a 
comprehensive and systematic search of the following academic databases: ProQuest 
Central, Homeland Security Digital Library, International Security and Counter 
Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, Academic Search 
Complete, Thoreau Multi-Database Search through Walden University’s library service, 
EBSCO research database hosted by U.S. Air Force library services, and Google Scholar.  
In my search, I identified relevant past and current research using the key word terrorism 
and derivatives such as terror, terrorist, ideological violence, religious terrorism, political 
violence, radicalization, and anarchy. Once I collected a significant amount of data 
relating to terrorism, a similar search process was conducted for counter-terrorism, 
community planning and emergency response strategies using a combination of the 
preceding database resources. Each academic journal article was crosschecked against 
Ulrich’s Periodical Directory to ensure the article met criteria for peer review. The 
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database searches yielded 253 resources that met the academic standards and relevance to 
the study. Literature that was discarded included duplicative information, non-peer 
reviewed research, and literature that had limited relevance to the study based on 
inconclusive results or poorly defined research methodologies.  
 Due to the amount and academic range of terrorism research, I chose to follow a 
categorization framework for the literature review established by McAllister and Schmid 
in the London:  Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (2013). Although several 
alternate literature review models were examined for categorical sorting, the model used 
by McAllister and Schmid provided a comprehensive model for understanding the 
complexity of current terrorism theories and the interrelationships that exist. Following 
McAllister and Schmidt’s framework, a brief synopsis of popular research trends is 
provided along with a more detailed review of the theoretical categories determined to be 
the most relevant to the current study. 
State of Terrorism Research 
The scope of terrorism literature ranges from a wide variety of scholarly books to 
a vast amount of peer reviewed academic studies. Despite the amount of research 
literature available, terrorism is not a commonly understood phenomenon. The field of 
terrorism research currently lacks a widely accepted single definition and a does not have 
a generalized consensus regarding what constitutes an act of terrorism (Blackbourn, 
Davis, and Taylor, 2013; Schmid, 2013). Finding an appropriately scoped definition was 
essential for conducting further research. 
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Definitional Challenges  
A resounding theme throughout the terrorism and counter-terrorism research 
literature is the lack of a comprehensive definition upon which scholars have agreed. 
Terrorism research centers and academic leaders in the field identified more than 250 
distinct definitions surrounding the concept of terrorism (Stampnitzky, 2013; Blackbourn, 
Davis, and Taylor, 2013; Easson and Schmid, 2011, Schmid 2004, Jenkins, 1980). The 
lack of a single definition or generalized framework to describe acts of terrorism is 
problematic for several reasons. These reasons include, (a) the inability to establish 
formal legal parameters and law enforcement measures, (b) validation issues across 
academic research and scientific studies, (c)challenges for policy makers as they frame 
and implement counter-terrorism and security policies, and (d) issues for international 
regimes as they work to implement humanitarian assistance and refugee programs (DHS, 
2015; START, 2016; Schmid, 2014; Price, 2012; and Crenshaw, 2007). The definitional 
issues grow exponentially when you consider the international nature of terroristic 
threats, multinational recruitment, clandestine financing and indiscriminate violence that 
are all considered counterterrorism challenges. Despite the lack of consensus on the 
parameters of a definition, there does seem to be an overwhelming consensus among 
international leaders, legal analysts, researchers and scholars, that the concept of 
terrorism needs a definitive framework to effectively identify, criminalize, and punish 
acts of terrorism effectively. Creating a workable definition is not as simple as it might 
seem; for example, the U.S. Department of State (2016) defines terrorism as 
“premeditated, politically motivate violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by 
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subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” 
This seems to be a reasonable working definition yet the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) uses a slightly different definition for homeland defense, classifying 
terrorism as, “[t]he unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives.” Although the two organizations have 
different roles within the U.S. government, the lack of consensus on a working national 
definition is exaggerated when the threat crosses international borders.  
Global leaders have not come to a consensus on a basic framework to define acts 
of terrorism. Alex Schmid, current director of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), 
posited four potential reasons why scholars have a difficult time defining terrorism. 
Schmid (2013) explains that definitions of terrorism have been altered for more than 200 
years; diverging based on the academic lens and contextual environment through which 
the phenomenon is being examined. Additional challenges emerge as definitions of 
terrorism are interpreted within the frameworks of the legitimization, de-legitimization, 
and the criminalization of certain groups within a specific culture or societal norms. In 
addition, several types of terrorism exist, each manifesting itself in a different form and 
various levels of intensity that may require different counter-approaches.  
The definitional discussion becomes more challenging when one population 
defines an act of violence as terrorism, while another defines the same act of violence as 
a revolution or an act of heroism directed against a repressive regime (Europol, 2013; 
Human Rights Watch, 2012; and United Nations, 2006). The most comprehensive 
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attempt at a formalized definition to date is that of Alex Schmid. Through his research he 
identified ten key elements that he determined must be included in a workable definition 
of terrorism:  
1) the demonstrative use of violence against human beings; 
2) the (conditional) threat of (more) violence; 
3) the deliberate production of terror or fear in a target group; 
4) the targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents; 
5) the purpose of intimidation, coercion and/ or propaganda; 
6) the fact that it is a method, tactic or strategy of waging conflict; 
7) the importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences; 
8) the illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence; 
9) the predominantly political character of the act; 
10) the use of terrorism as a tool within psychological warfare to mobilize or 
immobilize sectors of the public. 
Focusing on these ten definitional elements, it is possible to explore the history of 
ideological violence and terrorism research with greater depth and fidelity. 
Historic Patterns 
Ideological based violent behaviors have appeared along a spectrum of increasing 
threat levels from non-violent campaigns and political warnings to coordinated terrorist 
attacks resulting in mass civilian casualties. Throughout the literature, concepts of 
ideological violence and terrorism have been given various labels including: anarchy, 
crusade, jihad, political activism, radicalization, rebellion, revolution, and Zionist 
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movements. To include peer reviewed research that covers the full spectrum of threat 
used as a means of achieving a political agenda, the terms terrorism and ideological 
violence will be used interchangeably throughout this study. An efficient and effective 
method for examining the history of terrorism is to begin by categorizing the patterns of 
terroristic organizations and the tactics that have been used to create public fear with the 
expressed goal of forcing political change (Rapoport, 2002; Bruce, 2013, Weissman, 
Busch, and Schouten, 2014; Brannan and Strindberg, 2014). 
Conflict and war have been components of social interaction for as long as 
humans have been keeping records. Founded on a balance of power concept, sociologists 
and political analysts indicate that social stability and peace have resulted when 
competing powers are in balance. This does not necessarily need to be real balance but 
the perception of balance by both parties involved. Without the backing of a nation state, 
terrorist organizations and individual terrorists do not have the resources to project 
political or military power effectively against a large state based opposing force. Under 
these circumstances, terrorist organizations often resort to violence as a means of gaining 
influence within an unbalanced power struggle. Within the historic literature, power 
struggles are quite common dating back to the early first century. One of the most 
relevant and notable power struggles was the rise of the Jewish Sicarii who used 
asymmetric strategies to defend against a superior Roman Army in Palestine. From the 
volumes of historic documentation related to ideological violence and religious terrorism, 
it is notable that violence has been a common tactic chosen by members of various 
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political and religious movements to include Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Sikh, and 
Buddhist organizations. 
To focus on the modern age of terror and to gain a better understanding of current 
trends in terrorism research, David Rapoport (2002) categorized the history of terrorism 
into four waves or chronological patterns beginning in the late 1800’s. Each wave is 
distinguished by the underlying motivation for violence and the methods used to create 
public fear and to force political change. 
1870-1920s: Anarchist Wave 
The Anarchist Wave, also known as the Golden Age of Assassination, first 
appeared within the boundaries of pre-soviet Russia spanning 1870-1880s (Rapoport, 
2002). During this time there were very few researchers studying terrorism as an 
independent field; most of the early terrorism research was being conducted under the 
disciplines of political science, international studies or psychological studies. As time 
passed, historians migrated toward the topic of terrorism due to its mystery and intrigue, 
however, a clear understanding of the motivation behind terroristic acts remains elusive.  
The Anarchist Wave, said to be inspired by communism and the technological 
revolution in the late nineteenth century, provides early evidence of radical groups using 
telegraphs and the rotary press to mass produce newspapers for spreading their opposition 
propaganda and to recruit followers. As one example, the Russian term стратегия 
террора-strategiya terrora (English translation: strategy of terror), was first used by 
Russian newspaper writers in the late 1800s to describe the surge of violence conducted 
by members of the Revolutionary People’s Will. This strategiya terrora violence was 
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specifically directed at the political leadership with the distinct purpose of instilling fear 
among the masses. Anarchist doctrine leaned heavily on propaganda of the deed, relying 
on ancient traditions of tyrannicide, in which greater levels of violence was desirable and 
celebrated. This early wave of terror was made more volatile with the emergence of 
handguns and dynamite. 
Although the rash of violence started in Russia with the assassination of Russian 
Czar Alexander II; it set a new precedence for political opposition globally. The 
additional technological achievement of steamship railways allowed the Golden Age of 
Assassination to quickly spread throughout Europe bringing about the assassinations of 
Elizabeth, the Empress of Austria, Uberto the first King of Italy, and expanded into 
America with the assassination of U.S. President William McKinley in 1901 (Rapoport, 
2002). 
1920s-1960s: Anti-Colonial Wave 
The second wave or Anti-Colonial Wave is assessed to be a direct result of events 
taking place shortly after the First World War and the signing of the Peace Treaty of 
Versailles. The forced re-ordering of world powers set the stage for anti-colonial 
sentiment and national self-determination which were further accelerated by the outcome 
of the Second World War. Beginning in the early 1900s as peasants and colonists 
demanded self-determination and independence from formalized governmental 
repression. Terrorist groups of this time did not consider themselves terrorist at all. 
Rapoport (2002) indicates that Menachem Begin, the self-proclaimed leader of Irgun 
terrorist organization, referred to his members as freedom fighters that were protecting 
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their colonies from government terror by targeting the security forces, police and those 
responsible for maintaining colonial control. During the anti-colonial wave, opposition 
groups held unprecedented support from large sympathetic local communities despite 
their use of guerrilla tactics and the hit and run attacks they used to draw attention to their 
causes (Rapoport, 2002). 
1960s-1980s: New Left Wave/Marxist 
 The New Left Wave refers to the period of terrorism which includes the Red 
Brigades that rose up across Europe and the left-wing movements that expanded globally 
throughout the 60s. Rapoport concludes that the Vietnam War became one of the primary 
catalysts for the rise of Western left-wing terrorism. The withdrawal of American troops 
without a distinguishable victory gave rise to not only anti-American sentiment, but also 
to the idea of a weaken imperialist that provided hope for other marginalized groups 
throughout Europe, Latin American and the United States.  
 Revolutionary groups during this period were known to use urban guerrilla 
tactics, hostage taking and hijackings to bring attention to their cause and pressure 
governments to act on their behalf. Most notable of this period was the attack on the 
Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany by the Palestinian 
organization, Black September. In addition to the theatrical and symbolic attacks, the 
New Left Wave was a period of domestic revolution that promoted protest rallies 
advocating political reforms. Some of the more violent rallies were conducted by extreme 
leftist groups such as the North American Weather Underground, a group of student 
protestors opposed to the Vietnam War. Although not typically designated as terrorist 
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movements, the American radical democratic traditions which include the anti-Vietnam 
movements, the Stonewall Riots, and the African American civil rights movements 
throughout the 1950s, 60s and 70s, highlight the types of political and social turmoil that 
was occurring in the United States at that time (Hall, 2011). It was during this period that 
terrorism research began to have more significance as an independent academic field, 
focusing primarily on the actual methods terrorist organizations were choosing and the 
psychology behind prominent terrorist attacks (Wohlstetter, 1959; Schelling, 1963; Janis 
and Mann, 1977). Today, terrorism researchers continue to look at these historic events to 
inform our government leaders and help them understand significant social and political 
patterns as they make and enforce policy decisions (Neumann, 2013; Law, 2015; 
Chaliand, 2016).  
1970s-2020s: Religious 
The Fourth wave is akin to a religious upheaval starting around 1979. An 
exploration of the literature reveals that terrorists’ activity during this time included 
uprisings across multiple religious’ sects pitting one faith against another or religious 
leadership against government rule. Most of the terrorism research during this time 
explored the ideological and political motives that were driving individuals to commit 
acts of terrorism (Jenkins, 1980; Leary, Shepperd, McNeil, Jenkins and Barnes, 1986; 
Schmid and Jongman, 1988). Starting in the early 1990s there was a significant drop in 
academic interest with very few scholars choosing terrorism as a topic of research 
(Sageman, 2014). Despite the lack of academic interest, terrorism remained a viable 
tactic for expressing discontent, shifting away from the secular and nationalistic 
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movements toward more socially and culturally structured insurgencies supported by 
religion and theological interpretations (Reed, 2013). 
Post 9/11 Security Environment 
 With a clearer understanding of the concept of terrorism and a brief discussion 
regarding the historic trends that have shaped how the global population interprets acts of 
terrorism, it is important to determine who, and which disciplines have been studying 
various elements of terrorism and to explore some of the advances being made 
throughout terrorism and counter-terrorism research. Today terrorism research is a 
vibrant field of study with thousands of researchers across the globe working diligently to 
address a multitude of social concerns and related security threats. Similar to 
psychological and anthropological studies, the preponderance of terrorism research has 
its foundations in the social sciences, focusing heavily on the study of human behavior 
and how disruptions in social systems influence violent behavioral outcomes. Like most 
hot topics where there is a lot of money to be made, terrorism research is expanding 
rapidly across academic fields and exploring a multitude of new theoretical foundations 
to not only explain terrorism but to address the growing global security concerns. Given 
this new security environment and the demand for not only answers but also counter-
terrorism solution, many of the early terrorism experts are dusting off their old theories 
and testing them against this new age of terrorism. Brian Jenkins wrote in his 1975 study, 
“many of today’s terrorist want a lot of people watching but not a lot of people dead”. In 
2006 he rephrased that statement to state “many of today’s terrorists want a lot of people 
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watching and a lot of people dead”. This is a new age of terrorism, one that is vastly 
misunderstood and critically under researched.  
Theoretical Directions 
 Similar to the definitional challenges, researchers have had a difficult time 
establishing a theoretical model that is flexible enough to address the complexities of 
terrorism research. Early researchers used the more prominent political science, 
international relations, psychological, and social science theories as foundational 
frameworks for explaining terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon. Today, researchers 
are finding that none of the existing theoretical constructs adequately address the 
complex nature of terrorism or the multiple forms of terrorism that exist. Many scholars 
and practitioners are choosing to create their own unique theories, allowing them to 
integrate multiple lines of inquiry and expand the terrorism discussion across disciplines. 
Some of the more popular theoretical frameworks and research directions include 
theories traditionally used in international relations, political science, history, military 
science, psychology, criminology, law, and communications disciplines, however, we are 
also seeing theories emerging from organizational psychology, marketing and 
international business models. With the variety of disciplines being used to study 
terrorism, it is not surprising that the number of terrorism theories is expanding without 
replication or validation methodologies in place. Popular theoretical foundations include: 
power-political theories, state sponsored, or regime directed theories, intra-war and 
asymmetric conflict theories, rational choice and economic theories, ethnic and cultural 
isolation research, radicalization and suicide studies, communicative and organizational 
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theories, studies examining group dynamics, as well as research exploring cultural 
assimilation and globalization theories (Carlton and Schaerf, 2015; Conrad, Conrad, and 
Young, 2014; Cutter, Richardson, and Wilbanks, 2014). Scholars and practitioners have 
used a variety of methods to categorize the various terrorism theories into usable 
groupings that they can in turn assign to various counter-terrorism strategies. The 
following categorization process is adapted from the work of Bradley McAllister and 
Alex Schmid in the 2013 version of The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. 
State/Regime Based Terrorism 
 Historically, state sponsored, and regime terrorism produced the most casualties 
of any form of terrorism. By the existing statistics alone, state terrorism should be a well-
funded research topic with high interest. However, as international relations and conflict 
management scholars will confirm, it is also one of the most difficult forms of violence to 
define and study. In addition to the definitional challenges, scholars have had limited 
access to primary data due to linguistic and cultural barriers. This is exacerbated by the 
restrictions imposed by the same repressive regimes scholars would want to study to 
conduct validate empirical studies. A few notable studies have been conducted using 
primarily second-hand data in the aftermath of a regime’s fall from power. The central 
premise relies on identifying and separating legitimate policing actions carried out by the 
state during peacetime versus repressive actions that have been designed and carried out 
to control or oppress a population. Well known authors in the study of state terrorism 
include Dallin’s and Breslauer’s (1970) exploration of totalitarian regimes and their use 
of sanctions. In cases in which the regime lacked political influence or material resources, 
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such regimes resorted to coercive measures to include terroristic tactics. Ted Gurr’s 1986 
study is also among the foundational literature addressing state terrorism literature in 
which he explored the power relationships that take place between the elite and non-elite. 
Gurr provided an in-depth look at the use of positive and negative incentives that elite 
populations used to maintain their authority. Although a good study to reference within 
the context of state terrorism literature, it is difficult to align Gurr’s 1986 findings within 
the current global environment regarding state terror. However, Gurr is one of the early 
experts that have continued to study terrorism and state conflict. His recent work includes 
co-authoring a number studies to include a book published in 2013 incorporating and 
updating some of his earlier findings (Mincheva, Grigorova, and Gurr, 2013). Despite not 
being as robust as expected, there are some newer promising theories that are providing 
insight into current state and regime-based terrorism. In a separate study conducted by 
Escriba-Folch, (2013) the concept of using state repression as an instrument to maintain 
power was examined. Escriba-Folch chose a quantitative method using a simultaneous 
equations model measuring the likelihood of autocrat exit in relation to a dictator’s use of 
repression. Although the study did not address the question in the context of violence that 
constitutes the definition of state terror, it did provide insight as to why a leader might 
want to use repression and at what level of repression a population might revolt or seek 
outside foreign assistance. Hultquist, (2015) followed a similar political repression 
framework using a time series research design to explore the use of state repression as a 
way of controlling domestic insurgencies. The study provides some generalizable data to 
add to the overall literature, however the study methodology does not account for social 
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variations that are inherent under different regimes as well as the impact of power-
political relationships within the global environment over the established time. 
 New research by Wood, Gibney and Haschke, (2016) demonstrated a growing 
sophistication in state terrorism research. Wood, Gibney and Haschke used quantitative 
data drawn from the Political Terror Scale to measure state ordered repression. Using 
some of their previous work and the Freedom House scale comprised of five distinct 
levels of state terror. The new study offers some validation to the idea that increasing 
levels of state repression to the point of violence, increases the likelihood of domestic 
instability. However, greater understanding of the cultural variables using first person 
interviews could improve the quality of the results and make them more valid for use by 
the United Nations and other aid organizations as they examine security options. 
 In addition to internal domestic terrorism, states have been known to provide 
financial and material support to foreign terrorist organization for various reasons. In 
some cases, there is a political agenda for supporting an organization such as gaining or 
maintaining regional stability; in other cases, the state’s leaders may share an ideological 
belief with the organization they choose to support. Some notable studies focusing on 
state sponsorship of terrorism include Daniel Byman’s (2005) study in which he found 
that the level of sponsorship ranged from a state providing a high level of state resources 
to a foreign cause, to cases in which the state provided more passive levels of support. 
Building on his 2005 study, Byman’s (2008) study examined Iran’s use of terrorism and 
sponsorship of terrorism. Although Byman conceded that the results were not promising 
and indicated that Iran found significant value in using terror tactics and threats as a 
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political tool, he did provide insight that demonstrated Iran has a threshold by which they 
determine who and what terroristic activities they are willing to support. The study falls 
short of first hand empirical data from the actual leadership of Iran, which may prove to 
be unachievable in the context of terrorism studies. However, a strong representation 
from subordinate leaders or those who have left Iran under political asylum might be a 
worthwhile pursuit to improve the validity and add context to the study.  
 In a similar study using some of Byman’s underlying hypotheses, Kirchner (2014) 
used a qualitative case study model to examine the utility of state sponsored terrorism and 
at what point a state might determine continued support has lost its utility for the 
sponsoring state. The study looked at three cases: The Mujahedin al-Khalq organization, 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the support offered to arm Palestinian factions by 
neighboring states. Building on previous work, Kirchner found evidence in which state 
support achieved political goals, security goals, and financial goals for the sponsoring 
state. In other cases, support for terrorist organizations and illicit regimes appeared to 
have no value other than as a response to foreign interference that the sponsoring state 
not only disagreed with but was willing to use state resources to confront what it deemed 
as injustices. 
 Acts of terrorism can also be hidden beneath the cover of war. These breaches of 
the laws of war may include genocide and ethnic cleansing, or the creation of large 
refugee populations in the neighboring states. As with state terrorism research, intra-war 
terrorism is also a very difficult topic to effectively address without physical access or 
linguistic and cultural knowledge; therefore, many western researchers have looked to 
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alternate terrorism topics to address. No empirically validated studies regarding intra-war 
were found within the recent literature. Much of the literature regarding this topic appear 
to be summarizations of existing terrorism studies within the context of an intra-war 
theme or in the context of a hypothesis the author would like to draw attention to or put 
forward for further analysis. A recent study focusing on inter-war terrorism is worth 
noting based on the underlying theoretical framework that was chosen. Alex Wilner 
(2013) used deterrence theory to analyze counter-terrorism strategies in the context of an 
ongoing conflict. I chose this article primarily because deterrence of non-state terrorism 
has been a highly debated topic in national security professions. Therefore, a basic 
understanding of the limited literature regarding this topic does have value for this 
specific study. Wilner follows up on a concept put forward by Marth Crenshaw, in that 
you cannot have a strategy that is designed to both deter and destroy at the same time. 
Based on deterrence theory, these two strategies are incompatible. In the case of terrorism 
in an intra-war context, the end goal often centers on removing obstacles that will impede 
the achievement of your objectives, thus elimination of threat. Wilner (2013) examined 
the idea of deterring potential actors from an actual attack which is very different from 
the elimination of an individual or organization as a military objective. In his review of 
recent conflicts, Wilner found opportunities in which a deterrence strategy had some 
potential. This type of strategy is complicated when the goal is elimination but for 
smaller insurgent groups within a conflict several of the existing deterrence studies show 
promise and validate the need for further research on this topic. State sponsored terrorism 
studies provide information to national level leaders to develop national level policies or 
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to advocate for international response strategies. For this study, a detailed review of 
insurgent level terrorism studies provides more relevant insight.  
Insurgent Based Terrorism Theories 
 An increasingly dangerous extension of state terrorism and state support to 
terrorism has been the rise of radicalized insurgent groups. Terrorism in relation to 
insurgencies is a far more popular research topic for both scholars and practitioners due 
to current global events and the global expansion of Islamic terrorism. Despite increased 
interest by highly qualified and established terrorism scholars, current terrorism studies 
focused on insurgencies have not yielded the desired outcome practitioners had hoped 
for. A surge in the amount of government and private funding available, combined with 
very narrow timelines, has produced a large pool of self-proclaimed, poorly educated, 
and inexperienced terrorism experts. Although most seasoned terrorism scholars have 
good intentions, they are competing with professional think tanks and independent 
authors who appear to be capitalizing on public fear. Under these circumstances, authors 
are producing a lot of interesting ideas but very few high quality empirically validated 
studies. Within the insurgency research, there are several studies worth noting. Using 
McAllister and Schmidt’s (2013) framework, the main theories have been grouped by 
agent-based analysis, institutional based analysis, and systemic based analysis. 
Agent-based Analysis: Radicalization  
 Agent based models are designed to explore a phenomenon by examining the 
individual participant. In the case of terrorism, these studies focus on the people that act 
independently (a lone-wolf actor), the people that chose to join a terrorist organization 
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and participate as a member, the people that lead an organization by providing directions 
to operatives, or the people that chose to provide various levels of support to a terrorist 
organization. Focusing on agent-based analysis, three theoretical categories were chosen 
to capture the underlying premises of the top radicalization theories in use today: social-
psychological based theories (Neumann, 2013; and Post, 2015), social identity theories 
(Brannan and Strindberg, 2014), and rational instrumental approach/cost-benefit analysis 
frameworks (Crenshaw, 2015). 
Social-psychological Based Theories 
 Social-psychological approaches include both sociological and psychological 
theories as well as integrated theories that combine attributes of both (Speckhard, 2012, 
Koomen, and Van der Pligt, 2015). Psychological explanations have traditionally 
explored ideological violence and terrorist activity through an examination of the 
terrorist’s cognitive capacity and emotional stability, whereas sociological frameworks 
look at an individual’s proclivity and ability to interact within the established norms of 
their society. Under social psychological disciplines researchers are exploring questions 
such as: what is going on in the attacker’s head, how do they think, how do they behave, 
is there something that makes this person different from others in similar social 
circumstances. Traditionally, psychological theories have explained inappropriate 
behavior as the outcome of disruptive psychopathic personalities, psychological illness, 
or emotional instability (Post, 2004, 2007; Moskalenko, and McCauley, 2011; Freilich 
and LaFree, 2015). Many of the top scholars disagree that most terrorists are plagued by 
some form of psychosis; examination of multiple terrorist events indicate that most actors 
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demonstrate high levels of cognitive complexity in the planning and execution of these 
operations (Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Parkes, 2014; Freilich and LaFree, 2015; 
Creswell, 2014). Other researchers have indicated that violent individuals may display an 
inability to control aggressive behavior or have a predisposition for using violence as a 
method of control. (Hogg, Kruglanski, van den Bos, 2013, Kooman and Van der Plight, 
2015). However, there are very few studies in which the researcher had first person 
access to the terrorist in which they would be able to make that level of psychological 
analysis. Modern social psychological researchers, to include Jerrold Post, have expanded 
traditional psychological interpretations to include the terrorist’s social motivations, 
exploring destructive urges or emotional disturbances to explain radical behavior in 
someone who is seemingly normal (Parkes, 2014; Freilich and LaFree, 2015; Gill, 2015; 
Post, 2015). Others argue that there is evidence to suggest that individuals engaged in 
ideological violence may be radicalize to an extent in which they begin to demonstrate a 
lack empathy toward others or show characteristics of possessing dogmatic ideologies or 
utopian worldviews; yet, this data is also from second hand sources and interpreted 
through existing generalizations without direct empirical evidence (Kaplan, Loow, and 
Malkki, 2014; Fatfouta, Gerlach, Schroder-Abe, and Merkl, 2015; De Juan, 2015). 
 Beyond lone-wolf cases and a few rare examples associated with terrorists who 
were studied in a prison setting, the psychosis argument for terrorism is difficult to make 
without additional empirical evidence. However there does appear to be several studies 
that point to alternate socialization and criminology explanations for terrorism (Simon, 
2013; Hallett and McCoy, 2014, Reid Meloy and Yakeley, 2014; Gill, and Corner, 2013). 
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Based on existing literature and ongoing research, scholars have determined that an 
individual needs a certain level of cognitive capacity to effectively engage and participate 
as a member of terrorist organizations. Based on an understanding of various terrorist 
organizations, psychotic behaviors do not appear to be conducive to the organizational or 
operational requirements (Silke, 2015). Various social-psychological theories have 
proven effective in describing why some individuals join terrorist organizations, why 
they leave, and what psychological impact participating in a terrorist organization and 
engaging in terrorist acts have had on the individual (Bhui, Everitt, and Jones, 2014; Reid 
Meloy and Yakeley, 2014; Post 2015). An exploration of the social-psychological 
literature does indicate that individuals who are joining terrorist organizations tend to be 
from more risk acceptant populations; according to the data, this population includes 
males typically between the ages of 18 and 25 (START, 2016). This is an interesting 
finding due to the connection with traditional developmental psychology theories in 
which researchers believe that the early 20’s is about the age that a personal identity and 
an awareness of self is adopted (Adams and Marshall, 1996; Kroger, 2014; Carlsson, 
Wangqvist, and Frisen, 2015). As an extension of developmental psychology theories, 
one of the more prominent social-psychological theories used today to study ideological 
violence and religious terrorism is social identity theory. Social identity frameworks 
appear at both the agent level of analysis and at the institutional level of analysis. 
Social Identity Theories (SIT) 
 Studies exploring religious and ideological violence often start with a social 
psychological approach, founded on the notion that belief systems play a key role in 
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motivating an individual to participate in or conduct acts of terror. Social identity theory 
posits that an individual’s identity and understanding of who they are is largely based on 
the groups or social structures they belong to (e.g. social class, family, football team etc.). 
This social categorization provides a sense of belonging, pride and self-esteem but it also 
allows for social comparisons and prejudices leading to the creation of an in-group and 
out-group. Brannan and Strindberg (2014) found that SIT is effective in that it allows for 
the Emic (indigenous or native point of view) to communicate with the Etic (informed 
outsider/social scientific point of view) creating a more comprehensive understanding of 
the issue at hand. Using the framework of social identity theory has also shown to be an 
effective method for analyzing how religion might influence an individual’s 
interpretation of self and their relationship to others (Brannan and Strindberg, 2014; 
Turner, Brown, and Tajfel, 1979). Socialization with others is enhanced if the individual 
feels like the group is worthwhile, that they will be accepted and appreciated within the 
group. Disassociation with a group occurs when the opposite is at play. The individual 
may feel marginalized or unappreciated by a group they are currently in. This 
marginalization may result in frustration and feelings of injustice to the point at which the 
individual may seek revenge. Silke (2015) indicated that these feelings are real; they do 
not have to be in response to a personal injustice but can be directed toward a vicarious 
injustice, to include injustices aimed at a group the individual does not currently belong 
but may sympathize with. Horgan (2005) explained that the process of becoming a 
terrorist is a gradual socialization with the tenants of an extremist ideology. Once an 
individual is accepted into the group, there is a level of psychological strength and 
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discipline that is needed to stay loyal and obedient to the organization. The third phase in 
Horgan’s model is the point at which the individual chooses to or is forced to departure 
from the group. Departure from the group requires both psychological and physical 
disengagement to be considered completely outside the group (Horgan, 2005). Ideally, 
practitioners want to prevent an individual from ever joining a terrorist movement or 
adopting an extremist ideology but there is explicit value in understanding all three stages 
in Horgan’s model to development counter-terrorism strategies to engage with an 
individual terrorist member. 
At the institution level of analysis, social identity theory focuses on processes that 
create and maintain the in-group identity and allow for the collective decision to resort to 
violence. At this level the organization draws a stark contrast between the concepts of us 
and them, assigning positive attributes to the in-group while simultaneously assigning 
inferiority and in some cases, evil and sin to the out-group. This process of 
dehumanization is often necessary to allow members to disregard common moral statutes 
and willingly victimize out-groups. The most pressing question practitioners are asking is 
why an individual chooses to identify with a specific terrorist group or extremist 
ideology. Social identity theory continues to be a valid framework for understanding and 
analyzing the processes by which ideological socialization takes place. In her 2003 study, 
Jessica Stern was among some of the first terrorism researchers to gather primary data 
from individuals who had engaged in terrorist acts or were actively and knowingly 
supporting terrorist networks. Stern found that each interview provided very different 
viewpoints about the organization or ideology as well as the level of commitment the 
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individual gave to the organization. In each case there was a socialization process that 
transformed the individual from a member of their society (family or community group) 
to a member of a more extreme ideological group. In some cases, in which the individual 
was providing funding, training, or supplies, it was a natural transformation based on 
existing belief systems, the political environment in which they lived and the opportunity 
to contribute based on personal resources. For others it was a transformation based on 
new knowledge, altered interpretations of pre-existing ideologies or in response to the 
displacement from or disenchantment with a previous group to which they belonged. 
Stern has expanded on her early research with a recent case study involving the 
reintegration of a Swedish Neo-Nazi member in 2014. Sterns used a qualitative model of 
analysis to capture the personal narrative regarding radicalization and the participation of 
her subject in the Swedish Neo-Nazi movement. She indicated that throughout her years 
interviewing former terrorists, active members of terrorist networks and supporters of 
terrorism, she saw great value in sitting down and talking to these men and women to 
understand their motivations and in some cases, gain a better understanding of the paths 
that led to their de-radicalization (Sterns, 2014). 
In addition to Sterns’ work, there are a few key authors that stand out as respected 
experts in the radicalization field. Ehud Sprinzak’s 1998 work set the stage for modern 
radicalization studies, in his study Sprinzak concluded that radicalization appears to be a 
process of social de-legitimization moving an individual from conventional types of 
social participation and political activism to more extreme forms of violent social 
objection. Building upon Sprinzak’s work, scholars have created several step models to 
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describe various levels of radicalization with the intent of creating points at which 
practitioners might influence or de-radicalize the individual (Pruyt and Kwakkel, 2014; 
Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélanger, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi, and Gunaratna, 2014; Victoroff, 
Adelman, and Matthews, 2012). Many of these foundational concepts have stood the test 
of time and provide the frameworks by which current researchers are approaching 
radicalization studies. In a 2012 study by Bartlett and Miller, they concluded that there 
are two types of radicalization: those who actively support or participate in violence and 
those who remain non-violent, choosing to actively denounce the violence of other 
similar ideological organizations. Radicalization is thought to be a slow process of 
socialization in which the individual develops adversarial political, religious, 
environmental, economic or other ideological attitudes, values and beliefs. Continued 
exposure over time to extreme ideologies reinforces the beliefs and moves the individual 
to become an active participant in a radicalized group or to act as lone-wolf extremist. In 
many cases the process of radicalization is apparent through progressively anti-social 
behaviors and supported by existing cultural or socially adopted beliefs (Abbas and 
Siddique, 2012; Carter, 2013; Victoroff, Adelman, and Matthews, 2012). It is the visible 
changes in behavior that law enforcement and intelligence agencies are looking for as 
they attempt to deter and prevent terrorist attacks (Jenkins, Liepman, and Willis, 2014; 
Jenkins, and Godges, 2011). Carter and Carter (2013) described some of the non-
traditional sources of information that law enforcement agencies are using effectively. 
However, their research indicated that more work needs to be done in collaboration with 
the community and improvements in community reporting and information sharing 
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networks (Pruyt and Kwakkel, 2014). Early identification of the anti-social behaviors is 
key to countering radicalization and preempting a planned attack. A recent study by 
Dugas and Kruglanski (2014) examined three categories of contributing factors within 
the process of radicalization: motivational, ideological, and social factors. Dugas and 
Kruglanski’s study is one of few studies that have used first hand data by having access 
to former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) members detained in Sri Lankan 
rehabilitation centers. One drawback to using this population is that the study relies on 
the personal interpretations of the subject’s radicalization process and their understanding 
of what constitutes support for armed conflict. This population may also be problematic 
due to existing biases or the personal goals of the terrorists based on incentives provided 
for cooperation with the study and the amount of time they have been incarcerated and 
separated from the front lines of the violence. The results of Dugas and Kruglanski’s 
study did show positive indicators for participants in the rehabilitation program but there 
is some question as to what would happen to these individuals if they are released back 
into their original communities where the radicalization processes started.  
Rational choice theories are also a popular research topic at the agent level of 
analysis. Simon Perry and Badi Hasis (2015) took a slightly different approach to 
radicalization by examining the phenomena of suicide bombing using a criminological 
theory of rational choice. Using rational choice, the authors started from the premise that 
suicide bombers make their choice based on a process of cost/benefit analysis in which 
they will gain some form of reward through their actions. Perry and Hasis used a case 
study approach to examine the life of a suicide bomber to determine what type of rewards 
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or benefits the individual may have been considering. Perry and Hasis support some of 
the findings in Victoroff, Adelman, and Matthews (2012) study showing that socially 
identifying with likeminded family members and the greater Muslim community allowed 
suicide bombers to associate positive rewards with the need for radical actions. Using a 
similar analytical technique, Cohen (2016) focused on the content of the language used in 
farewell letters sent shortly before committing a suicide bombing. Using a process of text 
analysis, Cohen’s study demonstrated a higher rate of prosocial motives for choosing 
suicide bombing. There are significant challenges in both these studies due to the 
inability to speak with the suicide bomber. However, both studies do show that a rational 
decision-making process was in place and that in both cases the bomber did consider 
some benefit or positive motivations which can be very useful for identifying counter-
narratives.  
A large majority of the radicalization literature focuses on the radicalization 
process as moving toward violence. However, we cannot discount the value of research 
that seemingly targets critical points within the radicalization process for de-
radicalization (Abbas and Siddique, 2012). Brannan and Strindberg pointed to the work 
of Floyd Allport and his Contact Hypothesis written in 1955. From Allport’s work three 
influence models were created to dispel stereotypes and facilitate dialogue between in 
and out groups. The first approach focuses on cross categorization using one social 
category to cancel out another (Allport, 1955). Finding categories that both groups share 
such as ethnicity, nationality, age, gender, social class or a shared religious affiliation 
creates a common sense of belonging. By building on those common group identities, a 
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more in-depth dialogue can be achieved. The second approach is to re-categorize, 
bringing both groups under an inclusive subordinate group. This re-categorization may be 
a temporary re-grouping for an alternate purpose. Although the goal in this case is to 
create dialogue with terrorists, we are seeing this dynamic take place in the global war on 
terror in which traditional conflicting states are joining together in the fight against 
extremism. The third approach is to de-categorize; a process of eliminating the 
conflicting category altogether. In this approach the idea is to bring two opposing groups 
together, allowing them to interact with the goal of eradicating unfounded stereotypes 
(Brannan and Strindberg, 2014). There appears to be value in pursuing such approaches, 
yet as many practitioners will admit, approaching terrorist organization or their members 
is difficult, if not impossible. Most leaders of these organizations rely on maintaining 
loyalty among the ranks by isolating their members using distain for the out-group as 
motivational propaganda. 
In some cases, psychological and mental illness hypotheses have proven to be 
valid, as well as many of the social identification theories and the processes by which 
individuals radicalize. However, most of modern terrorism researchers agree that very 
little empirical evidence exist to generalize a psychological or social explanation. 
Terrorists appear to be psychologically stable and rational in their decision-making 
capacity, indicating potential external motivators (Eglin and Hester, 2017; Fussey, 2015; 
Crenshaw, 2015). Several of the studies in radicalization agree that there is some level of 
personal decision making that takes place and that there is sufficient evidence that lone-
wolf terrorists, organized attackers and suicide bombers go through a process of 
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rationalization prior to committing a terrorist act, however, the research challenge 
remains due to the lack of empirical evidence and first-hand data in these cases. 
Institutional Analysis: Organizational Management  
Rational instrument theories are listed under a few titles: power-political, strategic 
choice, and rational choice; however, the underlying hypotheses are similar. Such 
theories focus on the decision-making processes and choices that terrorist actors and 
terrorist organizations must make to achieve their objectives. Dave Brannan and Anders 
Strindberg (2014) indicated that power-political theories often share traits found within 
the realist theories used in the discipline of international relations. In this context, 
terrorist groups appear to prioritize self and group interests over ideological or common 
moral statutes. Observations of terrorist organization demonstrated that the leaders of 
successful groups displayed a keen understanding of the social and political environment, 
and made strategic choices based on an understanding of the social boundaries that 
allowed or limited their ability to achieve their objectives (Barrett, 2011, Abrahms, and 
Potter, 2015). In a similar study Phillips and Pohl (2014) used prospect theory to examine 
the economics and psychology of a terrorist’s or terrorist organization’s decision-making 
process regarding the methods and level of violence chosen and whether there appeared 
to be copycat behavior based on an assessment of previous terrorist events. Phillips and 
Pohl used RAND-MIPT derived data regarding the number of injuries and fatalities 
caused by acts of terrorism to determine if a terrorist or terrorist organization might make 
choices based on their knowledge of previous attacks or their desire to surpass the actions 
of a predecessor. Phillips and Pohl determined that greater insight into terroristic 
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decisions processes can be gained using a prospect theory framework than by using an 
expected utility framework (Phillips and Pohl, 2014). Within the field of terrorism 
research, the work of Martha Crenshaw stands out as exemplary; in nearly every branch 
of terrorism research you will find reference to a theory developed by or based on the 
work of Crenshaw. Her most seminal work is in the field of organizational process theory 
(OPT) as it relates to the managerial dynamics of terrorist organizations. Organizational 
process theories posit that an organizations ultimate end goal is survival of the 
organization itself and therefore the individual values and objectives of its leaders and 
members remain subordinate to the organizational goals. To achieve its objectives, 
terrorist organizations establish formal operational structures and systematic processes 
similar to other voluntary organization. The formal structures and systematic processes 
provide a legitimizing avenue by which organizational decisions are made and orders are 
given. Crenshaw argued that the leaders of these organizations take on leadership roles 
out of a desire for prestige, while members of the group are recruited and maintained 
through a series of incentive-based structures. Crenshaw did not discount the 
psychological and social theories; they serve as frameworks for understanding some of 
the drivers that transform an individual or group from espousing a moderate ideology to 
one that actively pursues an extremist ideology. Leaders of terrorist organizations are 
keenly aware of the power of the psyche and exploit their members desire to belong to a 
group. It is through the institutional structures that members gain social status and 
material benefit, thus Crenshaw concluded that the survival of terrorist organizations is 
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dependent upon the leadership's ability to maintain a formal structure that is also 
conducive to the purpose for which they exist.  
Historically, ideologically based organizations have had a difficult time with 
long-term endurance. Crenshaw indicated that membership in these types of 
organizations is not an easy transition for most individuals to make; it requires a complex 
set of foundational beliefs that lend to a revolutionary mindset. These beliefs are then 
solidified through association with other likeminded individuals who also believe that the 
current system is fundamentally flawed. Through isolation, the leadership relies on 
members to help solidify the organizational goals to a point at which they become the 
individual’s duty required for personal salvation. At the organizational level these same 
goals are reduced to the mere survival and longevity of the organizational structure, 
which may account for some of the irrational behaviors researchers have observed 
(Crenshaw, 2011). 
Recruiting members is often the easiest task, maintaining an active organization is 
far more difficult. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013) explored various reasons why a 
terrorist organization might fail. Using a data set of 586 terrorist groups, Gaibulloev and 
Sandler determined that such groups had greater survival rates if they were primarily 
religious based, were large, had multiple home-base locations in democratic states, had 
limited their reliance on transnational attacks and were able to diversify their methods of 
attack. Gaibulloev and Sandler’s study supports earlier research by Crenshaw which 
indicated that conducting an effective terrorist operation requires various levels of 
strategic planning. Successful operations need to be coordinated with logistical support, 
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funding, specialized skill sets and individuals with specific psychological traits that allow 
them to participate freely (Crenshaw, 2011). Often acts of terrorism appear to be random 
or indiscriminate acts of opportunity. Berrebi and Ostwald (2013) indicated that such 
attacks may not be random but rather a choice to exploit existing chaos. Berrebi and 
Ostwald examined terrorism data sets and emergency events databases, to determine if 
terrorism increased after a natural disaster or if terrorist were using natural disasters or 
emergency events as soft targets to enhance their message and increase the impact of 
their terrorist activity. Results from Berrebi and Ostwald’s study demonstrated that 
disasters provided more effective opportunities to strike traditionally hard targets such as 
governments when they are in the midst of recovering from chaos (Berrebi and Ostwald, 
2013). 
Recruiting/Propaganda 
Communication theories are examined through two different terrorism lenses: 
from the perspective of recruitment using propaganda and from the perspective of being a 
method of communicating the organizations political demands. In a few studies the 
authors looked at the propaganda and the political activism aspects of terrorism as 
methods of achieving behavior modification (Heger, 2015; Schmid, 2013, Carter and 
Carter, 2013). Schmid argued that the victim is not necessarily the target of a terrorist act, 
they serve as an instrument used by terrorist organizations to enhance their propaganda 
message by invoking the emotions of the general population. Through this lens, the act of 
terrorism serves not only as propaganda for recruiting likeminded individuals; it also 
intimidates, persuades, and coerces government leaders to adopt the terrorists’ demands 
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(Heger, 2015). Regarding communication, suicide terrorism has been very effective. 
Research focusing on suicide terrorism includes both agent-based analyses regarding how 
these individuals are recruited for suicide missions and instrumental analyses in the 
context of how suicide terror is used as a communication method. Carter and Carter 
(2013) posited that although large terrorist organizations exist, homegrown terrorism is of 
great concern. Many of the homegrown terrorists lack formal ties with larger organization 
yet they have access to a wide variety of propaganda produced by such organizations 
drawing inspiration. Building upon the work of Mia Bloom (2005) and Robert Pape 
(2006), Pedahzur and Perlinger (2009) examined the phenomena of Palestinian suicide 
bomber within an organizational framework model using social network analysis. Using 
social network models, they found some interesting organizational patterns that 
contradicted previous assumptions. First, they found that terrorist organizations in 
Palestine appeared to be local and cross-organizational. These local organizations were 
based on pre-existing family ties and friendships with members who had not previously 
joined other extremist networks. The smaller family networks gave the Palestinian 
organizations a very tribal quality in which members participated out of allegiance to the 
family rather than the notion of radicalization. Contrary to traditional views that suicide is 
the product of a rational choice made by the organization, Pedahzur and Perlinger found 
that the members who became suicide bombers were often local activists that appeared to 
be on the fringes of the larger organizations. Since the early 2000’s there has been a 
significant increase in the literature related to suicide terrorism, a lot of which still uses 
the foundational work conducted by Pape, Pedahzur, and Bloom. Santifort-Jordan and 
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Sandler (2014) recently examined suicide terrorism as a method of obtaining a political 
or social objective through the intimidation of a larger audience. Using a combination of 
data from multiple data sets, the researchers studied 2448 unique suicide attacks 
beginning in 1998 thru 2010. The findings demonstrated significant differences between 
domestic and transnational suicide attacks and the significance of hardened targets 
regarding the terrorist organization’s choice to use a suicide bomber. The study 
demonstrated that terrorist organizations might use a variety of tactics against soft targets 
but often chose a suicide bomber if the target is little more difficult to gain access to. The 
use of a suicide bomber was deemed more likely to succeed because the attacker could 
blend in with a crowd and attack when they felt the casualties or messaging value would 
be the highest. Due to the amount of propaganda and increasingly violent choices terrorist 
are using to instill fear in the population and recruit new members, researchers have also 
been focusing on counter narrative strategies (Braddock, Horgan; 2016; and Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2013). The research on terrorist organizational structure has helped policy 
makers and law enforcement agencies understand the motivation and tactics of terrorist 
organizations as they design and assess the types of counter-terrorism strategies within 
the context of domestic and transnational threats. 
Systemic Analysis: Causes of Ideological Grievances 
The third main academic approach centers on the exploration of the root causes. 
Multi-causal theories are complex, having no single explanation for why acts of terrorism 
occur but assume that multiple factors are at play. At the systemic analysis level, scholars 
look at potential external causes, macro-sociological indicators that have been linked to 
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various social dysfunctions creating instability. Macro sociological factors may include 
harsh climates, political and social infrastructures, geopolitical borders, technological 
advancements and increased global mobility (Tilly, 2015). Structural theories include 
studies that examine economic systems, political structures, and elements of social 
welfare. This area of research is gaining a lot of attention in the field of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism for obvious reasons, but it is not necessarily a new field or one that is 
exclusive to terrorism. The underlying themes are quite common in political science and 
criminology studies. Although some researchers have focused on one of the three 
systems, a large portion of the literature includes analysis of multiple systemic causes to 
include the impacts of globalization. In the work of Daniel Geller and Alvin Saperstein 
(2015) they chose a mathematical model to examine the causes of suicide terrorism 
through the interaction of three variables: terrorist, defender, and the population. They 
make some basic assumptions in the creation of their model. First, the population will 
only join the terrorist bandwagon if they perceive the defenders to be losing. The study 
focuses on three cases: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. Although the study was 
designed to produce some generalizations for further study, the explanation of the results 
is difficult to glean from the mathematical model that was used. The term bandwagon 
was also problematic due to various interpretations of what was happening in each 
country study. A broad analysis of the study does reveal that the success of counter-terror 
operations may increase if the defender maintains the support of the population. In a 
similar study by Piazza (2013) terrorism was examined within the context of political 
systems and the type of regimes that hold power. Piazza found that democracies 
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experienced far more terrorist events than states ruled by dictators due to the level of 
control maintained by the leadership. Within the study, Piazza discovered that while 
democracies experience a higher rate of terroristic activity, new democracies experienced 
more terrorism than established democracies. Similar studies that examined political 
systems support Piazza’s findings in that nations that are under political transition often 
struggle to establish effective government structures and stable social infrastructure 
(Crenshaw, 2014).  
Enders, Hoover, and Sanders (2016) took a different direction in their 
examination of terrorism and looked specifically at economic factors. In their study they 
explored the hypothesis that a state’s real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has a 
correlation with countries that have a high rate of terrorism. Using a non-liner regression 
model and data from The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) they examined eight 
terrorism incidents using the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events 
(ITERATE) data regarding casualty events spanning from 1970 to 2010. The results of 
the study show a strong nonlinear relationship between per capita income and terrorist 
events. The authors noted that their study distinguishes between domestic and 
transnational terrorism during the era of leftist prevalence. Although useful for providing 
historic insight, the study does not address religious or nationalistic motivations that may 
be critical to security practitioners today. An alternate economic study was conducted by 
Blomberg, Fernholz and Levin (2013) in which they focused on the economic viability of 
the target country by looking at economic prosperity and its relationship to a state’s 
national security, acts terrorism within the state, and acts of piracy against foreign vessels 
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transiting the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The study concluded that there is a 
relationship between targets of piracy and affluent countries; however, in relationship to 
targets of terrorism, the data demonstrated that there was no relationship between a 
country’s income and it being targeted by a terrorist attack. Carter (2014) also examined 
the relationship between the financial well-being of a state and the prevalence of 
terroristic threats and came to a different conclusion. In his study he found that states 
with the greatest ability to fight terror experienced higher levels of terrorism than weaker 
states. Weaker states placed a higher priority on deterring terror and thus they 
experienced less attacks (Carter, 2014). 
Choi and Piazza (2016) chose to examine the impact of political exclusion and the 
advent of domestic terrorism. The authors noted that some of the motivation behind 
conducting the study was to address some of statistical weakness they had found while 
conducting previous studies on a similar data set. In addition to validating some of the 
hypotheses on this topic they noted the lack of quantitative data examining ethnic 
discrimination and rates of terrorism. The study concluded that irrespective of how acts 
of terrorism are quantified, there is a significant correlation between ethno-political 
exclusion and domestic terrorism. Plumper and Neumayer (2014) supported these 
findings, arguing that both domestic and international terrorism stems from multiple 
grievances and in most cases terrorism has stemmed from political disagreements 
between the terrorists and the ruling government. A study by Ghatack (2016) showed 
similar statistical results that linked discrimination of ethnic minority populations to 
terroristic behaviors. Ghatack, (2016) examined the impact of discrimination, economic 
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viability, and political openness as predictors of terrorism. An assessment of 172 
countries found that there appeared to be strong support linking countries that had high 
rates of discrimination against minority groups to higher rates of domestic terrorism 
under open economic and political systems. Ghatack’s chosen methodology and data set 
provide a robust empirical statistical analysis. The findings of this study support existing 
research that has linked current economic globalization trends combined with weak 
democratic structures to the emergence of terrorist activity (Ghatack, 2016; Schmid, 
2013).  
The impact of culture and social traditions has also been examined in relationship 
to acts of terrorism within all three models of terrorism research: agent based models 
looked at the impact of specific cultural traits that place some cultures at higher risk, 
institutional based models looked at the impact of cultural traditions and family ties on 
the formation of the organization and the management structures they chose, and system 
based models have examined the impact of cultural traits on the likelihood of a minority 
population assimilating into larger social systems. Schmid indicates that structural 
theories based on culture have not provided a lot of empirical data and may be an area 
that needs additional study (Schmid, 2014). Within the more recent literature focusing on 
the impacts of culture, Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey and Feinberg (2013) examined the impact 
of cultural factors in relation to the number and type of terrorist attacks. Using data pulled 
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and controlling for economic and religious 
variables, their results demonstrated several cultural based correlations such as fatalistic 
beliefs that appeared to be core values within the culture, strict gender roles, and 
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communal structure that were linked to greater lethality in the type of attacks. This study 
provides insight for creating culturally appropriate approaches to counter-terrorism. Yet 
the study is limited by only focusing on cultural factors that encouraged violence without 
also looking at how those cultures were integrated or exclude from social and political 
structures within the state. While there are limited expectations for terrorism studies to 
cover a wide range of factors that might contribute to terroristic behaviors, there is a more 
modest expectation that such cultural studies might include primary data from individuals 
living in these cultures. Such primary data is critical for understanding how members of 
the culture or ethnic group might interpret their place in the social, economic, and 
political systems under review. A study conducted by Malik, Sandholzer, Khan, and 
Akbar (2015) is one study that meets the primary data criteria using structured surveys. 
Malik et al. explored a variety of risk factors to determine which factors might have the 
greatest influence on whether a population engages in terrorism. Focusing on existing 
empirical studies the researchers were able to generalize approximately sixty-five factors 
determined to be significant within the context of causing terroristic behaviors. Using 
these sixty-five factors, the researcher created a survey and sent it out to members of a 
Pakistani community. Analysis of the returned surveys highlighted thirteen factors that 
the population had identified as high-risk factor for causing social grievances. It is 
interesting to note that within this study none of the top factors related to economic 
disparity or educational disparity as several western researchers surmised, but did include 
factors related to political structures, perceptions of government corruption and 
cultural/ethnic discrimination that also appeared in the findings of Gelfand, LaFree, 
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Fahey and Feinberg (2013). Although it appears that culture has a significant role in 
terrorism research, Malik, Sandholzer, Khan, and Akbar (2015) study does not support 
the idea that terrorism is the result of cultural factors, but rather determined by how 
society integrates or isolates a culture. Malik et al. (2015) showed that members of their 
target population perceived leadership as dishonest, felt that their legal system was unjust 
and unfair in the enforcement of accountability, felt that high-levels of corruption existed 
within the government, that the national security forces were poorly trained, and that a 
majority of their population was excluded from the creation of government policies. The 
use of primary data collected through structured surveys combined with the researchers’ 
knowledge of the culture and language added validity and credibility to the study. 
Counterterrorism 
Counter-terrorism literature is often intermingled within terrorism studies. This is 
problematic in many cases in which terrorism researchers have not operated with a view 
to understand the phenomenon; rather they examine their topics antagonistically with the 
view to facilitate defeat. Using this antagonistic framework there is an increased risk of 
biases which may compromise the validity of such research (Brannan and Strindberg, 
2014). However, there is also value in examining terrorism with the goal of developing 
counter-terrorism strategies. Plumper, and Neumayer (2014) argue that terrorism and 
counterterrorism are logically connected. Understanding the type of terrorist or terrorist 
organization is foundational for determining effective counterterrorism policies, legal 
statutes and law enforcement measures, as well as the development of community 
resiliency measures. Plumper and Neumayer indicated that acts are terrorism are often the 
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result of a disagreement between the radical group and the domestic government. Under 
these circumstances, they argue for increased political responsiveness and accountability 
measures. Plumper and Neumayer, also indicated that foreign nations such as the U.S., 
who offer counterterrorism support to weak governments, will likely experience a rise in 
transnational terrorist events on their own soil. Foreign support and domestic policies 
need to be carefully considered because they will likely require the implementation of 
additional unpopular counterterrorism policies and law enforcement measures at home 
(Crelinsten, and Schmid, 2012). Because it is likely that the U.S. will continue to support 
struggling nations and often become involved in counterterrorism efforts in foreign 
countries, the research on domestic counterterrorism strategies is critical to our 
understanding of terrorism and the associated research gaps. Recent studies show that 
despite a lot of work in counterterrorism and counter radicalization policies, it has been 
very difficult to determine best practices following each successful terrorist event 
(Birkmann, Cardona, Carreño, Barbat, Pelling, Schneiderbauer, & Welle, 2013, Bossong, 
2014; Bigo, Carrera, Guild, Guittet, Jeandesboz, Mitsilegas, & Scherrer, 2015). 
Policy Implementation/Legal Frameworks 
A majority of the counterterrorism research focuses on the creation of policy and 
the implementation of policing activities that occur after a community is attacked. Due to 
the reactive nature of counterterrorism research there is very little consensus on the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies. Wormeli (2014) argued that early national 
response strategies demonstrated an inability to respond to a crisis in a coherent manner. 
Critical review of the 9/11 response by community, state, and federal agencies 
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demonstrated that a lot of work needed to be done. One of the greatest hurdles to a 
prevention strategy is the need for information sharing across agencies and the 
implementation of increase community surveillance to identify suspected terroristic 
behaviors. Although information sharing, and surveillance has become easier with 
technological advances; increased surveillance is limited by existing civil rights statutes. 
Findings within the 9/11 Commission Report led to the development of The Department 
of Homeland Security and considerable funding to address communication issues and 
improve the interoperability of state and local agencies to respond to catastrophic events 
(9/11 Commission, 2004; Cook 2009; Donahaue, Robbins, and Simonsen, 2011). 
However, over the last ten to fifteen years, law enforcement and policy makers have 
come to the realization that the best counterterrorism strategies are those that work 
toward prevention rather than crisis response (Carter and Carter, 2012; Wormeli, 2014). 
One of the greatest hurdles to a prevention strategy is the need for information sharing 
across agencies and the implementation of increase community surveillance to identify 
suspected terroristic behaviors. Although information sharing, and surveillance has 
become easier with technological advances; increased surveillance is limited by existing 
civil rights statutes. 
Community Partnerships and Recovery 
Given such challenges, there is a need for community-based policing models that 
aim to develop strong relationships with members of the higher risk communities 
(Wormeli, 2014). One framework for addressing this challenge is the concept of 
omniculturalism as presented by Pelfrey (2014), Omniculturalism is an opportunity for 
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communities to adopt counterterrorism policies and practices that engage with 
communities through superordinate goals connecting the community irrespective of 
racial, ethnic, or religious backgrounds. Pelfrey argued for more community integration 
allowing for the creation of community advisory councils comprised of a diverse 
population of the community to include different religious organizations, ethnic groups, 
immigrant populations, public organizations, private business leaders, and government 
agencies (Pelfrey, 2014, p. 487). Similar advisory councils and counterterrorism 
strategies have been created in the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) 
with questionable results (Bossong, 2014; Rashid, 2014; Choudhury, 2013; and Bonino, 
2012). Bossong explained that substantive cooperation across the EU is frustrated by 
divergent national interests and limited academic consensus. Such frustrations are also 
complicated by the diversity of terrorism threats and the lack of comprehensive strategies 
designed to address a wide variety of scenarios resulting in increased levels of fear and 
public outrage (Christensen, Laegreid, and Rykkja, 2013). Bossong concedes that some 
of the existing policies enacted by the EU, have limited cross-national integration and 
accentuated repressive and authoritative policies over policies that should be supporting 
early prevention (Bossong, 2014). One of the more prominent studies within the 
counterterrorism literature is that of LaFree and Bersani (2014) in which they have used 
data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for 1990 to 2011 to examine the social, 
economic and urbanization characteristics of geographic areas where terrorist attacks 
have occurred in the United States. The results of their review pointed toward a higher 
level of terroristic behavior in counties characterized by higher levels of language 
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diversity, an increased number of foreign-born residents, high rates of residential 
instability and higher proportions of urban residence. The results also demonstrated that 
terrorist behavior was less common in counties characterized by concentrated 
disadvantage, supporting existing terrorism research that disassociates economic disparity 
from higher levels of terrorism (Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor, 2012; and Malik, 
Sandholzer, Khan, and Akbar, 2015). Additional community-based research conducted 
by McGinty, Sziarto and Seymour-Jorn (2013) examined the connection between 
religious belief systems and terroristic behaviors. McGinty et al. (2013) narrowed their 
research population to a small Milwaukee Muslim community to determine the impact of 
collaboration regarding how Muslim communities are portrayed in research and the 
reality of countering Islamophobia. The study outlined the collaborative efforts between 
the researchers and local Sunni Islamic organizations and identified some of the 
challenges the researchers had regarding limited access to the population, survey biases 
as a result of the researchers not being Muslim, exclusion of other Muslim groups within 
the survey results due to the discretion and control held by the Muslim leadership they 
were working with. However, McGinty, et al. (2013) did find several areas in which 
Muslim populations can work with the community to overcome Islamaphobia and create 
more viable partnerships with government and community leaders. Bures (2013) and 
Berlin, and Carlstrom, (2015) both agreed that there is tremendous value in collaboration 
between government agencies and the private sector when it comes to counterterrorism 
strategies. Bures focused his study on the role of the banking sector in disrupting terrorist 
financial networks. Highlighting national security strategies that include public-private 
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partnerships, Bures argued that private organizations have a responsibility to assist 
government agencies to increase security. However, there are several challenges that 
must be overcome for private organizations to effectively contribute. Bures indicted that 
some of the challenges are policy based, while others stem from issues surrounding the 
legality and willingness of both parties to share information. Bures concludes that there 
may not be a perfect example of a successful public-private partnership but there is 
evidence that increased collaboration can improve counterterrorism strategies and build 
community resilience. Additional studies support Bures and the idea of building 
community resiliency through the extension of community and government partnerships 
(Buchalter, 2007; Bausch, Faria, and Zeitzoff, 2013; and Berkes & Ross, 2013). 
Hewitt (2014) reflects on how law-enforcements use of informers and information 
provided by the public to helped identify potential terrorist activity and improve law 
enforcements ability to prevent terrorist actions. Cozine, Joyal and Ors (2014) also 
indicate that using a network approach between law-enforcement and intelligence 
agencies improves and accelerates communication and coordinated movement between 
organizations to identity and address terrorist acts more rapidly. 
Summary 
If terrorism is among the most challenging security issues today, it is not 
surprising that a lot of research and academic resources are being directed to the study 
terrorism from multiple angles. In addition to understanding terrorism as an academic 
discipline, researchers are tasked to produce actionable recommendations that clients or 
practitioners can use to inform national security policies, create counter-terrorism 
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strategies, or develop comprehensive programs to de-radicalize or build community 
resiliency. Dave Brannan and Anders Strindberg (2014) indicated that terrorism 
researchers are not operating with a view to understand as is traditional to most academic 
and scholarly research. In the field of terrorism research, scholars are asked to examine 
their topics with a hermeneutic in which researchers approach their subject 
antagonistically with the view to facilitate its defeat. Using this approach has shown to 
taint and compromise the scholastic validity of the research (Brannan and Strindberg, 
2014).  
Despite this obvious challenge, terrorism research is also plagued by more 
pressing challenges, one being the lack of a common definition providing researchers an 
accurate base from which to start formulating research strategies. Additionally, due to the 
various forms of terrorism and number of contributing causes, researchers have failed to 
come up with a conceptual academic model. In absence of such model, researchers have 
attempted to force multiple disciplines into studying the various aspects of terrorism 
rather than creating a comprehensive picture. Despite nearly fifty years of academic 
research on the topic, the undisciplined process of crossing academic fields of study has 
not produced a significant amount of empirical studies for practitioners to draw upon. In 
defense of all the academic work and hours of data collection that has taken place, some 
of the challenge is created by the topic itself.  
Terrorism research is inherently dangerous, access to terrorist organizations or 
their membership is nearly impossible for academic researchers (Schuurman, and 
Eijkman, 2013). Beyond the security concerns, lack of cultural knowledge and linguistic 
68 
 
skills, combined with physical distance make studying this phenomenon extraordinarily 
challenging. In addition, Sageman (2014) argued that the surge of money for terrorism 
studies has been detrimental to the academic pursuit of validated explanations. The field 
now dominated by laymen, who control funding and prioritize according to their own 
questions, combined with an increase in self-proclaimed media experts conducting their 
own research, has distracted from and undermined true academic research efforts (p. 
566).  
Due to these challenges a lot of critical areas of terrorism research have been 
untouched. In 2011, one of the most influential authors on terrorism, Alex Schmid 
provided a list of the 50 top topics he felt had not been studied sufficiently and topics that 
still needed to be studied in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism. On a promising 
note, some of the topics have appeared in the recent literature or are currently under 
study. However, many of the critical topics may never be studied. The goal of this 
dissertation is to contribute to the literature that addresses one of Schmid’s under-
researched topics examining if there is disconnect between academic research on 
terrorism and the counter-terrorism practitioners’ understanding of terrorism. Chapter 3 
provides a detailed description of the research methodology that will be used to explore 
how counterterrorism research has been used in the context of one community’s strategic 
planning. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of the study was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of 
how U.S. communities respond to an act of domestic terrorism and to determine what 
collaboration efforts between governmental agencies (leaders, first responders) and 
nongovernment organizations (educational institutes, religious institutes, specialty think 
tanks, and aid organizations) are needed to design and implement community level 
counter-terrorism strategies. In Chapter 3, I describe the research design and the rational 
for choosing the topic, the role of the researcher, and the methodology and instruments 
that were used to collect the data. I provide a detailed description of the analysis process 
and the measures taken to ensure the credibility of the study’s findings. Chapter 3 
concludes with an explanation of the ethical considerations and the process by which they 
were addressed within the study. 
Research Design and Rationale 
A synthesis of the existing literature highlights the complexity inherent in 
identifying and addressing the underlying motivations that drive individuals and 
organizations to commit acts of terrorism. Without the ability to identify potential 
terrorists and prevent future attacks, effective counter-terrorism strategies become 
paramount. The uniqueness of each terrorist attack and the subsequent response sets the 
conditions for how the community recovers. Understanding which community activities 
have been effective in the past and which additional support was needed during the initial 
response and in the aftermath of an actual terrorist attack, may help community leaders 
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design and implement more effective counter-terrorism strategies. A qualitative case 
study design was chosen to explore the community response and recovery efforts prior to, 
during, and following the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. The study addressed the 
following question and sub-questions.   
Question 
In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and 
nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint 
counter terrorism services? 
Sub-questions 
1. What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organizations 
provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address 
ideologically based security threats? 
2. In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment 
agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural 
and multi-lingual needs? 
 A qualitative case study is consistent with investigating how government and 
nongovernmental leaders interpret, interact and engage in the preparation and 
implementation of a community’s terrorism response and recovery plan. 
I conducted a process of data triangulation to ensure data was collected from 
multiple sources and that such data captured individual interpretations of the terrorist 
event and the aftermath spanning twenty-two years from January 1995 to 2015. I 
recorded data using a thick description research process to ensure that qualitative data 
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was captured and interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as 
possible. In addition, I conducted an audit trail to ensure that sources of data were 
mapped chronologically and can be revisited and reevaluated within the context of new 
information or contradictory data. I conducted a peer review process periodically 
throughout the evaluation process to maintain research awareness and manage reflexivity, 
minimizing any research biases. (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014; Houghton, 
Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013). 
Role of the Researcher 
In the context of the case study, I have been the sole researcher for the project and 
do not have any professional or personal relationships with the volunteer participants. My 
professional analytical career informing and advising national security leaders provided a 
broad foundation of knowledge to inform the chosen topic and validate the appropriate 
methodology. My education and experiences working in national security provided 
opportunities to collaborate with experts in the nongovernment sector and integrate 
cultural awareness and diversity of thought in joint projects. These experiences working 
with leaders in the community have played an important role in how I designed this 
project and how the data were interpreted. To avoid bias interpretation, I chose a U.S. 
city that I have not visited and in which I have no personal or professional connections to 
the leaders, community organizations, or previous knowledge of any community planning 
efforts. The final analysis and results have been reviewed by two professional colleagues 
for general grammatical clarity and completeness of thought. To maintain the anonymity 
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of survey and interview participants, outside reviewers were not permitted to view the 
raw data contained in surveys or interview transcripts. 
Methodology 
The framework chosen for this study was a combination of Berger’s and 
Luckman’s social constructivism and Senge’s systems thinking theory. Social 
constructivism as interpreted by Berger’s and Luckman (1966), posits that humans can 
create their own systems of meaning in which they are able to understand their world 
through individual experiences and respond in accordance with their own interpretation 
of a shared event (Babbie, 2015). Social constructivism was an appropriate theory to be 
used within this case study as a framework for explaining interpretations of an event from 
the perspective of individuals who either experienced it first hand or have been tasked to 
provide services in the aftermath of the event.  
In addition to social constructivism, systems thinking theory based on Senge’s 
interpretation, was also chosen as a framework for interpreting this case study to address 
that fact that communities are comprised of a network of intra and interdependent 
systems (people, organizations, laws, and resources) working together to achieve a 
specific objective (Senge, 2006). Systems theory has been used in multiple disciplines to 
describe the interactions and dependencies of different agents within the system and 
helped bring together the individual interpretations of participants with the networked 
responsibilities inherent in comprehensive community counter-terrorism plans. Yin 
(2014) recommended a conceptual framework be used for conducting case studies, 
allowing the researcher flexible collection and interpretation options to develop a broader 
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understanding of the phenomenon being studied. Conceptual frameworks promote an 
inductive approach rather than a narrower formal framework designed explicitly to test an 
existing theory (Anfara and Mertz, 2014). Social constructivism has been used by 
terrorism and counter-terrorism researchers to develop an understanding of an 
individual’s interpretations and responses to their environment, as well as, the social 
exchanges that take place within social and cultural experiences (Pettman, 2000; Kayser, 
2015; Barnes, 2015; Resnick, Guimond, Wellman, Resnick, 2015).  
Combining elements of the two theoretical foundations into a social systems 
theoretical framework for research has been used successfully by Cavallo (2014) to 
examine community interactions within the context of disaster preparedness planning and 
within Carter’s (2011) study of human behavior within social environments. Cavallo and 
Carter used social systems frameworks within their research projects to describe the 
social interactions among individuals and others in a community setting similar to the 
community chosen for the proposed case study on Oklahoma City. The social systems 
framework was used successfully to explore interactions between individuals and 
provided insight into the way individuals behave within systems. Cavallo and Carter 
concluded that choosing the combined theoretical frameworks provided unique insights 
into the behaviors that allowed the various members of their chosen communities to co-
exist. The use of a similar framework for this study helped shed light on how members of 
Oklahoma City have co-existed and how service agencies have interacted since the 1995 
terrorist event (Cavallo, 2014; Carter, 2011). 
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Similar theoretical models such as structural functionalism and conflict theory 
were also considered based on a review of Potts’ and Vella’s (2015) analysis that 
explored elements of sustainability planning, Friedman’s (2014) study examining social 
class and cultures within global systems, and Bartolucci’s and Gallo’s (2015) terrorism 
study, for their similarities to the topic and research questions proposed in this study. 
However, structural functionalism and conflict theory were both rejected due to 
complexity in study design and the existence of research methodologies that constrained 
flexible collection and data interpretation. The primary and sub-research questions within 
this case study have been designed to broadly explore the effectiveness and efficiency 
within community processes as determined by the participants. A broader social systems 
thinking approach, similar to processes used by Alam and Husband (2013) and Barile and 
Saviano (2011) was needed to allow for the inclusion of individual interpretations, 
organizational structures and processes, and legal and policy limitations, as well as, to 
explore the impact of available resources and time constraints that may have a significant 
impact on the effectiveness or efficiency of the response and recovery processes chosen. 
A qualitative case study model was consistent with investigating how government 
and nongovernmental leaders interact in the preparation and implementation of a 
community’s terrorism response and recovery plans. To ensure a rigorous approach to the 
case study, a process of data triangulation was conducted, providing multiple sources of 
data and individual interpretations of the event. Data was recorded using a thick 
description research process to ensure that qualitative data was captured and interpreted 
as closely to the original intent of the information as possible. In addition, an audit trail 
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was conducted to ensure that sources of data were mapped chronologically and can be 
revisited and reevaluated within the context of new information or contradictory data. A 
researcher and peer review process were implemented periodically throughout the 
evaluation process to maintain research awareness and manage reflexivity, minimizing 
any research biases. (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, 
& Murphy, 2013).  
The research project consisted of a historic review of the case study using 
publicly available records, national, state, and local government reports, and scholarly 
research documents, media reports surrounding the event, journals, and statements made 
by individuals directly impacted by the event. In addition, structured surveys were 
administered to participating government and nongovernmental leaders exploring how 
government and community leaders plan and prepare for a potential terrorist attack. 
Participants were recruited based on their current positions within selected government 
agencies and nongovernment organizations. Each volunteer participant was asked to 
complete a self-paced structured survey via email or participate in two 30-minute phone 
interviews with the researcher. The initial phone call took approximately 30 minutes to 
answer the interview questions. Data collected from the initial interviews was deemed 
sufficient and a second phone call was not used. 
To avoid emotional or biased results, I have included a historic analysis process 
within the case study to draw upon and compare existing historic data with the survey 
results. Based on Yin’s guidance for case studies, a single-case study design was chosen, 
focusing on the Oklahoma City Bombings of 1995 (Yin, 2014, pp. 51-53). The 1995 
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Oklahoma City bombing was consistent with a single-case study design in that it 
represented a critical terrorism case in American history, was unique in that it was carried 
out by two U.S. citizens on a U.S. government building (statistically more likely than the 
threat posed by a foreign terrorist organization), it represented a set of common 
conditions that reasonably could exist in any U.S. city (a mid-size, mid-western 
community with no symbolic significance), and had the potential for revealing 
information that might not otherwise be attainable. An in-depth analysis of the Oklahoma 
City bombing event also had the potential to reveal information about community 
response actions and the subsequent level of community resiliency that resulted in the 
aftermath of an actual terrorist attack, representing two primary goals of my research 
questions. The final criteria for choosing the Oklahoma City bombing as a single-case 
study, was the availability of more than twenty years of historic data and retrospective 
analysis which provided an unbiased and comprehensive longitudinal study of a 
community’s systematic response to a nationally recognized and catastrophic terrorist 
event. 
Instrumentation 
A historic narrative analysis process was used to exploit and analyze historic 
records surrounding the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and emergency response records 
following the event to establish baseline data (Kim and Latta, 2009; Wikman, 2006; 
Ospina and Dodge, 2005). A structured survey was also administered to address the 
current state of counterterrorism planning by Oklahoma City leaders. Adjustments to 
survey questions were made based on the availability of data and the types of data 
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collected. Official reports, media reporting, academic studies and personal accounts were 
coded and weighted using Atlas.ti 8.0 software program and pre-determined coding 
criteria to account for source biases and any limits placed on the provided data. 
Data Collection 
A qualitative model using a case study methodology with structured survey 
questions was used. The data collection process included historic data and data derived 
from structured surveys and personal interviews conducted with volunteer participants. 
Data collected from government agencies included information regarding the roles and 
activities of city officials, law enforcement, and emergency services leaders, and social 
service agencies regarding counterterrorism strategies and operations. Data collected 
regarding nongovernmental participation included information about organizations or 
individuals which provided a critical service within the city’s strategic response plan (e.g. 
medical support, food and shelter, community education, or victim advocacy). 
The research process included a historic review using publicly available records, 
national, state, and local government reports, and scholarly research documents, media 
reports surrounding the event, journals, and statements made by individuals directly 
impacted by the event. In addition, a structured survey was administered to participating 
government and nongovernmental leaders exploring how government and community 
leaders plan and prepare for a potential terrorist attack. Participants were recruited based 
on their current positions within selected government agencies and nongovernment 
organizations. Each volunteer participant was asked to complete a self-paced structured 
survey via email or to participate in two 30-minute phone interviews with the researcher. 
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The first phone call took approximately 30 minutes to answer the interview questions. 
Participants agreed to a second phone call as needed to clarify information provided, 
however, the data collected from the first phone call was sufficient and a second phone 
call was not need. 
Data Analysis Plan  
 Historic records, data collected through a structured survey process, and data 
collected from individual interviews was analyzed using a four step process: 1) initial 
reading of historic records, surveys, manuscripts, and researcher notes in order to draw 
out recurrent themes using a constant comparison strategy, 2) a systematic indexing 
process was used to apply thematic codes to the raw data, 3) coded data was further 
analyzed and arranged chronologically according a predetermined thematic framework 
separating government agency and nongovernment organizational trends, 4) the final step 
in the data analysis process included the cross-referencing of survey data and interview 
transcripts against selected historic records to identify divergent concepts and time 
sensitive trends. (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014; Saldana, 2016). The analysis 
of data was recorded using a thick description interpretive process drawing upon patterns 
of behavior, social interactions, and cultural patterns, ensuring that qualitative data was 
captured and interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible 
(Finlay, 2012; Mason, 2017). Data was stored, coded and analyzed using Atlas.ti 8.0 
software and formal text analysis processing. 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
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A qualitative model using a case study methodology was used to conduct the 
research project. To ensure a rigorous approach to the case study, a process of data 
triangulation was conducted, providing multiple sources of data and individual 
interpretations of the 1995 bombing event. Data was recorded using a thick description 
research process to capture a detailed description of the environment, social setting, 
community atmosphere, and the personal perceptions expressed as described in the 
qualitative data. All data was written or relayed in English and interpreted as closely to 
the original intent of the information as possible. In addition, an audit trail was conducted 
to ensure that sources of data are mapped chronologically and can be revisited and 
reevaluated within the context of new information or contradictory evidence. A 
researcher and peer review process were implemented periodically throughout the 
evaluation process to maintain research awareness and manage reflexivity, minimizing 
any research biases. (Houghton, Casey, Shaw, and Murphy, 2013; Almutairi, Gardner 
and McCarthy, 2014). 
Transferability 
Oklahoma City was chosen based on the 1995 bombing attack on a federal 
building that has been defined as a domestic terrorist event. The city was also considered 
a strong case study based on its size, location, and diversity within its population; criteria 
that remain common in many U.S. communities today. The study findings add to the 
knowledge base and may provide insight regarding one community’s counter-terrorism 
strategies. The knowledge gained through this study may be used by other community 
leaders as they develop and implement their own counter-terrorism strategies.  
80 
 
Dependability 
The collected data was comprised of existing publicly available information 
produced between 1995 and 2015, including available historic records, media reporting, 
personal accounts, and written or filmed documentaries surrounding the Oklahoma City 
bombing. Data was collected from a variety of sources within the twenty-year time span 
until the researcher and research committee felt that the project had reached data 
saturation or at a point in which the data analysis began to duplicate research findings. 
Confirmability 
A research journal was used to capture step-by-step processes related to how 
general themes were chosen, how sources were identified, and data was collected and 
how the collected data was coded and interpreted. Data records have been mapped and 
stored chronologically allowing for periodic review and reevaluation within the context 
of new information or contradictory data. (Almutairi, Gardner and McCarthy, 2014; 
Houghton, Casey, Shaw, and Murphy, 2013). 
Ethical Concerns and Procedures 
Approval to conduct this research was requested from the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) at Walden University. A complete IRB application with a detailed 
description of potential sources and data collection methods was included. IRB approval 
of research plan was provided on 6 March 2017, # 03-07-17-0034795 with an expiration 
date of March 6, 2018. Care was taken to abide with appropriate copyright laws and 
requests for public records were conducted in accordance with existing regulations and 
procedures. Care was taken to ensure the collection and the content of the requested 
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information meet the intent of the study. Following common research practices, the use 
of pseudonyms for professional titles and names helped ensure the anonymity of 
individual participants. The overall reasoning behind the research project was to improve 
the quality of information available to community leaders and to promote the use of 
community resources and encourage the inclusion of appropriate cultural expertise in the 
formation of community response and recovery processes. 
All paper forms of notes were transcribed into a digital copy and destroyed. Any 
collected audio or video recordings were saved, and password protected on an external 
drive. When not in use the external drive was locked in a filing cabinet with any 
remaining paper notes. Transcripts of collected data will be held for 5 years for possible 
academic purposes at which point, they will be destroyed (Walden University, 2014). 
Summary 
An outline and detailed description of the research design is provided within 
Chapter 3, including the rationale behind choosing the topic and its relevancy to current 
national security issues and a need for expanded community-based counter-terrorism 
planning. A case study model using a combination of historic data and survey processes 
was chosen due to ethical concerns related to the sensitivity of the subject matter and the 
potential for biased data resulting from an interview, observation, or survey process 
(Tingley, 2014). The data collection consisted of detailed journaling and data 
management processes to ensure data was collected and stored according to validated 
research methods. Validated data collection tools, digital storage hardware and qualitative 
data coding software were used to collect and analyze the data. Although qualitative 
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research has historically been more difficult to validate, every attempt was made to 
ensure that any credibility and ethical concerns related to the collection of data and the 
distribution of the findings were addressed and approved by the Walden IRB and my 
dissertation committee prior to collecting and analyzing the data. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The rationale for conducting a qualitative case study of the 1995 Oklahoma City 
Bombing was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how a U.S. community 
responded to an act of domestic terrorism and how the event influenced collaboration 
efforts between governmental agencies (leaders, first responders) and nongovernment 
organizations (educational institutes, religious institutes, specialty think tanks, and aid 
organizations) as they designed and implemented community level counterterrorism 
strategies. To understand the context of the event and explore the experiences of the 
individuals present at the time of the bombing and those who have participated in 
designing and implementing current counterterrorism plans, the study answered the 
following research questions:  
Question 
In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and 
nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint 
counter terrorism services? 
Sub-questions 
1. What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organization 
provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address 
ideologically based security threats? 
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2. In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment 
agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural 
and multi-lingual needs? 
I begin Chapter 4 with a holistic description of event to provide the scene and 
atmosphere in which first responders and community leaders worked. The setting is 
followed by a general description of the historic documents collected, the coding 
processes used and the subsequent findings. Following the historic review results, the 
recruitment process and general description of survey and interview participants is 
presented. The remainder of chapter four describes the collection and coding processes 
used, the survey and interview finding and a summary of the results as they relate to the 
original research questions.  
Case Study Setting 
 I chose the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma for this study due to the community's first-hand experience with 
responding to and recovering from a domestic terrorist attack. The bombing was 
considered one of the worst acts of domestic terrorism in U.S. history at that time. The 
bombing occurred at approximately 09:03 AM, on Wednesday the 19th day of April. The 
bomber potentially considered that this was the middle of the week and that all the 
federal offices would have been fully staffed, the childcare center was full of children and 
customers were filled the waiting rooms. Characterization of the location chosen 
indicates that the bombing was designed to be particularly brutal. Although domestic 
threats existed, and less damaging terrorist plots had been carried out in the U.S., the 
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level of damage and death caused by the bombing presented unique challenges for local 
and state level emergency responders, as well as, created a new level of public awareness 
regarding terrorism threats within the borders of the U.S. All available information 
indicates that the success of the bombing was not due to any failure in intelligence 
collection or a lack of adequate security measures at the site. Convicted bomber, Timothy 
McVeigh, and his accomplices, were not on the radar of any law enforcement agencies at 
the time. Their actions leading up to the bombing did not raise any red flags or warrant 
security concerns. In retrospect, authorities believe that McVeigh had been harboring 
several ideological and political grievances for years that may have played into his 
decision to carry out the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building (Linenthal, 2003; 
Wright, 2007; Michel and Herbeck, 2015). Some of those key grievances developed 
during his time in the military because of the political atmosphere and personal events 
surrounding his discharge. His grievances grew, becoming more volatile in connection 
with his interactions with likeminded individuals and adoption of religious ideologies. 
The most prominent influence seemed to be his interpretation of the 1993 FBI siege of 
the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, and the government's lack of judicial 
responsibility. According to court records, McVeigh chose the second anniversary of the 
Waco siege, and targeted a federal building that housed FBI offices, to send a political 
message to authorities regarding his disapproval of the way the government handled the 
Branch Davidian incident and what he perceived as law enforcements abuse of the ability 
to impose on the rights of individuals. There have been extensive studies on the 
Oklahoma City Bombing and in-depth evaluations of Timothy McVeigh and Terry 
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Nichole’s patterns of behavior throughout their lives leading up to the event (Michel, and 
Herbeck, 2015). Each study has provided additional details, unique perceptions, and 
correlated factors that demonstrate the complexity inherent in identifying potential 
extremists before they attack and insuring proper response and recover resources are 
available to address the aftermath of an event. The Oklahoma City bombing was planned 
by a very small group of U.S. citizens using a Ryder rental truck to house the bomb. The 
building was a significant target; hosting the offices of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Secret Service, Army and Marine 
Corps recruitment offices, Veterans Administration, Departments of Defense, Housing 
and Urban Development, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Transportation, The 
Social Security Administration, General Accounting Office, Customs Services, and The 
General Services Administration. The building also hosted a Federal Employees Credit 
Union and the America's Kids Child Care Development Center. The burst of the 
explosion and debris extended approximately 48 blocks from the target, severely 
damaging surrounding buildings and destroying vehicles in the proximity. The initial 
explosion also took out the primary and back-up phone lines needed for first response and 
emergency services (FEMA, 1996; Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency 
Management, 1996). 
To focus on the counterterrorism planning, emergency response, and recovery 
efforts, I drew upon the activities performed and challenges experienced by first 
responders, government leaders at the local, state, and federal levels, and the individuals 
who provided coordination and support activities throughout and following the recovery 
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efforts. The study started with an examination of historic data beginning in April 1995 
through September 2015. 
Historic Data Collection 
General themes identified through the initial literature review process were 
grouped into two categories: government activities and nongovernmental activities. 
Focusing on each category, a comprehensive and systematic search of academic 
databases: ProQuest Central, Homeland Security Digital Library, Academic Search 
Complete, Thoreau Multi-Database Search through Walden University’s library service, 
EBSCO research database and Google Scholar was used to identify historic records and 
research using the key words Oklahoma City Bombing. Historic data was extracted from 
public records, research publications, published histories, personal accounts, and media 
reports relevant to the 1995 bombing event and to the counterterrorism planning and 
community resiliency efforts over the last 20 years in Oklahoma City, OK. Once a 
significant amount of data had been collected relating to the primary event, a similar 
search process was conducted for counterterrorism planning, community planning and 
emergency response strategies using a combination of the preceding database resources. 
The database search and evaluation process yielded 84 resources that met the academic 
standards and relevance to the case study. 
Analysis Process 
Historic reports, public records, research publications, published histories, 
personal accounts, and media reports were analyzed using a four step process: an initial 
reading of historic records, surveys, manuscripts, and researcher notes to draw out 
88 
 
recurring themes using a constant comparison strategy, next a systematic indexing 
process was used to apply thematic codes to the raw data, coded data was further 
analyzed and arranged chronologically according to a predetermined thematic framework 
which separated government agency and nongovernment organizational trends, a final 
cross-referencing of survey data and interview transcripts against selected historic records 
was used to identify divergent concepts and time sensitive trends (Almutairi, Gardner, 
and McCarthy, 2014; Saldana, 2016). The analysis of data was recorded using a thick 
description research process to ensure that qualitative data was captured and interpreted 
as closely to the original intent of the information as possible (Finlay, 2012). Data was 
stored, coded and analyzed using Atlas.ti 8.0 software and formal text analysis 
processing. 
Findings of Historic Review 
The historic review was focused on local, state, and federal government reports, 
public records, research publications, published histories, personal accounts, and media 
reports surrounding the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing event. Data drawn from the 
historic documents included the response efforts at the time of the event, lessons learned 
by organizations involved in the crisis response and any changes to the emergency 
planning efforts that have taken place as a result of the bombing. Through the historic 
review process several common themes emerged that provide a greater understanding of 
community level planning, the required resources for an effective response and the 
critical agencies that need to be included in the planning and coordination efforts. A copy 
of each document was uploaded to commercially available Atlas-ti 8.0 qualitative data 
89 
 
analysis and management software program and auto coded against pre-determined codes 
drawn from the initial literature review process. To determine commonalities and 
differences between government and nongovernment roles, the data was also sorted and 
coded for government and nongovernment response activities. The most prevalent themes 
were included in the following two tables along with generalized perceptions based upon 
the context in which the themes appeared in the historic data. 
Table 1 
 
Summary of Government Themes 
N=84 documents 
Prominent Themes Perceptions 
Barriers Most barriers could have been overcome through 
training. 
Blame Blame was directed toward those efforts that took longer 
than desired due to lack of coordination or limited 
resources. 
Collaboration Working with other agencies was difficult initially but 
got better over time. 
Communication Adequate communication between agencies was critical 
to recovery efforts and getting the resources to the right 
place at the right time. 
Communication systems Alternative options for communication networks needed 
to be in the plan. 
Community response The community was in shock but came together to take 
care of the victims and their families. 
Crime Most counter-terror incidents have a crime component 
and need to be addressed through law enforcement. 
Fear Different levels of fear were described depending on the 
role of individuals and the amount of information 
provided to them. Fear was more apparent after the event 
when individuals had time to re-evaluate the situation. 
Federal response Federal roles had not been clearly outlined in local 
planning documents. Awareness of federal resources 
needed to be integrated in the planning process early. 
Law enforcement  Police and law enforcement agencies played several 
different roles during the recovery efforts. Multiple 
agencies had responsibility for securing the site and 
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gathering evidence. 
Leadership Local leaders were generally effective at assigning duties 
and coordinating the initial response. As more agencies 
became involved organization of efforts became more 
complicated. Active planning between agencies prior to 
the event may have helped overcome some of the 
operational challenges.  
Media influence A media plan needed to be in place. Media often 
overstepped their roles and caused additional recovery 
challenges due to the release of misinformation. 
Mental health Mental health services played a greater role later in the 
recovery efforts addressing the needs of victims and 
family members. Mental health organizations continued 
to provide services to the wider community in the years 
following. 
Miscommunication The high casualty rate, the pace of recovery operations 
and the poor communication networks became 
significant factors leading to the initial 
miscommunication challenges. 
National reaction The event was considered a national tragedy. A lot of 
support services and long-term funding came from 
outside the state.  
Official roles The primary responsibility quoted by government leaders 
was to provide for the public’s safety. Official roles were 
identified early to accommodate the immediate security 
needs surrounding the damaged structures.  
Organizational challenges Most challenges stemmed from not understanding the 
special requirements of a terrorist event and the timelines 
for each recovery activity (e.g. securing structure while 
preserving the crime scene). There were challenges 
associated with determining who had the lead authority 
to make critical decisions. 
Organizational successes Oklahoma City Police were identified as performing very 
well under difficult circumstances. The assistance of 
state and federal agencies brought in the additional 
expertise needed to address the special circumstances 
surround the bombing event. 
Personal challenges A lack of appropriate training and initial guidance was 
cited as the most prominent challenge for individual first 
responders and the supporting agencies. 
Personal successes Successful recovery of victims was cited as the most 
rewarding. Being able to get victims back to their family 
members made all the other challenges seem worthwhile. 
Private business A local cellular company was able to provide phones and 
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cellular assistance when existing systems failed. The 
outpouring of relief supplies from the private sector was 
more than expected; although appreciated, the additional 
supplies caused significant storage and distribution 
problems. 
Public health Community public health services provided long-term 
care to victims and those in the community who were 
directly or indirectly impacted. 
Resiliency The level of community and national support allowed the 
city to recover far sooner than expected. 
Security The first priority upon arrival at the scene was to ensure 
the safety of the first responders and local citizens as the 
damaged structures were secured.  
State response State agencies played key roles in the coordination with 
federal agencies and ensuring that appropriate 
organizations were performing the roles they were 
authorized to do. (e.g. support from the National Guard 
and military units stationed in the area). 
Unofficial roles Individuals reported that even after their official roles 
were complete they stayed involved with the long-term 
recovery efforts and participated in the various support 
networks that were created after the event. 
  
Note. Thematic analysis of historic documents using Atlas.ti Qualitative Data Analysis 
(8.0). software. Coded themes (26) represent the most prominent concepts drawn from 
the initial literature review process. Perceptions describe the context in which the themes 
appear in the compiled Oklahoma City Bombing archived data as it relates to government 
roles. 
 
Table 2 
 
Summary of Nongovernment Themes 
N=84 documents 
Coded Theme Perception  
Barriers Nongovernment organizations had limited authority to 
provide services early in the recovery efforts. Hospitals and 
private medical care centers had the most prominent role 
but were quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the 
injuries. 
Collaboration Organization with existing public service relationships 
had an easier time getting access to the scene and 
receiving guidance from government leadership. 
Communication Accurate information was difficult to get in a timely 
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manner. Several organizations worked on the outskirts of 
the barricaded site and addressed community needs as 
they arose (e.g. food, water, and shelter for victims and 
volunteers).  
Community response Nongovernment organizations had the primary 
responsibility for addressing community-based needs and 
for the long-term recovery programs that followed. 
Crime Nongovernmental organizations filled a supporting role to 
local law enforcement agencies by providing long-term 
crime prevention programs and community level training. 
Fear Religious organizations were often cited as providing 
comfort to the community and religious counseling to 
victims and their family members. 
Leadership Nongovernment and the private business community 
provided construction equipment, specialized skill sets 
and financial resources that allowed first responders and 
government agencies to do their job quickly and more 
effectively. 
Media influence Media coverage of the event helped maintain public 
awareness and ensured that all requests for additional 
resources were communicated at a national level. 
Mental health Community organizations filled a large portion of the 
mental health service roles and provided long-term mental 
health services to the victims and their families.  
Miscommunication Maintaining open lines of communication between 
government agencies and the nongovernment volunteer 
staffs was especially challenging. Much of the critical 
coordination took place at the government level therefore 
it was difficult to coordinate support services in the early 
days. 
National reaction A great deal of logistic support and funding was provided 
by large non-profit organizations based outside 
Oklahoma. 
Official roles Each organization provided a very specific support 
service. Understanding which organization was leading 
each effort was challenging for government coordinators.  
Organizational challenges After action reports and lessons learned reflected the need 
for intra-agency planning and the coordination of 
resources. In addition to resource distribution, maintaining 
staffing needs over the extended recovery period was 
exceptionally difficult as most organizations had a small 
permeant staff and relied upon volunteers to deliver some 
of the services.  
Organizational successes As communication networks improved and roles were 
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clearly defined, a higher level of coordination and 
cooperation occurred between the government agencies 
and the organizations bringing in specialized equipment 
and skillsets. Within the context of a large-scale 
emergency, these outside services expanded the capacity 
of existing government resources.  
Personal challenges Many organizations reported that they had hoped to do 
more for the recovery efforts. The high demand on 
medical services and the risk of additional injury due to 
structural damage prevented several medical personnel 
from addressing minor wounds and providing initial 
medical triage at the site. 
Personal successes Organizations that had not been actively involved in 
emergency and community planning events made effort 
after the event to become more involved with the city's 
government agencies and engage more readily in public 
service projects. 
Private business Nongovernment organizations became the primary 
conduit for the private sector to get involved in the 
recovery through the allocation and distribution of 
resources and financial donations. 
Public health Nongovernment agencies provided the bulk of the public 
health services and continued to provide information 
resources for the long-term recovery efforts. 
Resiliency Community organizations played key roles in rebuilding 
the city's sense of security by providing community 
activities and long-term educational programs. 
Security Maintaining the safety of staff and volunteers fell upon 
the individual organizations. Lead government agencies 
insisted that volunteers and the organizations providing 
support services remain outside of the barricaded site to 
ensure first responders and recovery teams had unimpeded 
access. 
Unofficial roles Beyond the recovery efforts, nongovernmental 
organizations were responsible for assisting the citizens of 
the larger community overcome the long-term emotional 
and economic impacts. 
  
Note. Thematic analysis of historic documents using Atlas.ti Qualitative Data Analysis 
(8.0). software. Coded themes (21) represent the most prominent concepts drawn from 
the initial literature review process. Perceptions describe the context in which the themes 
appear in the compiled Oklahoma City Bombing archived data as it relates to 
nongovernmental roles. 
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 Within the parameters of the case study, media accounts were considered for the 
potential influence on the emergency response efforts and the distribution of public 
information. Media trends are represented by common headlines and various public 
sentiments surrounding acts of terrorism and a connection to the Oklahoma City event. 
Table 3 
 
Summary of Prominent Media Headlines 
Year Source Event Headlines 
1995 The New York 
Times 
Oklahoma City, OK Terror in Oklahoma: The overview; 
bomb suspect is held… 
1996 CNN 1st Anniversary Clinton signs anti-terrorism bill. 
1997 The New York 
Times 
2nd Anniversary Trial begins in the Oklahoma City 
Bombing case 
2000 CBS 5th Anniversary Victims of the Murrah Building 
Bombing 
2001 CNN 9/11 Event Terror attack hits U.S. 
2005 New York Times 10th Anniversary 10 Years after bombing, Oklahoma 
City remembers 
2010 The Christian 
Science Monitor 
15th Anniversary Oklahoma City Bombing: Is 1995 
repeating itself today? 
2013 Daily News Boston, MA Event Survivors of Oklahoma City 
Bombing offer hope for Boston 
Marathon victims. 
2014 The New York 
Times 
San Bernardino, CA 
Event 
F.B. I. Treating San Bernardino 
attack as terrorism case 
2015 CNN 20th Anniversary Homegrown extremist threat remains 
20 years after Oklahoma City 
Bombing 
2016 Fox News Orlando, FL Event 49 killed in shooting at Florida 
nightclub in possible act of Islamic 
terror 
2017 CNN/NBC Las Vegas, NV 
Event 
Deadliest shooting in modern U.S. 
history 
    
Note. Headlines represent general media perceptions and tone beginning in April 1995 
through each prominent anniversary and subsequent domestic terror events. 
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Within the parameters of the case study, policy and legislative records were 
collected but not included in the coding process. Policies and laws were considered 
within the context of providing legal authorities or government funding to counter-
terrorism programs or in support of emergency response efforts. The following laws 
demonstrate legislative trends surrounding acts of terrorism. 
Table 4 
 
Summary of Policies or Legal Statutes 
 Created by Policy or Law 
1995 -Executive Order 12947_Prohibits financial transactions with designated terrorist 
organizations 
-Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, US Senate Bills S.390 and S.761 
 -Oklahoma Anti-Terrorism Act 
1996 -Public Law 104-132: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
2001 -Public Law 107-42: Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act 
 -Public Law 107-71: Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
 -Executive Order 13224_Seizure of assets of anyone accused of committing or 
supporting acts of terrorism 
-Public Law 107-56: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT 
ACT) Act of 2001 
 -Public Law 107-134: Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 
2002 -Public Law 107-296: Homeland Security Act of 2002 
 -Public Law 107-197: Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 
2002 
 -The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 
 -Public Law 107-297: Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
 -Public Law 107-173: Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 
2002 
 -Public Health and Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and response Act of 
2002.                               
2003 -Oklahoma Emergency Management Act of 2003 
 -Public Law 107-306: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 
2004 -The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
 -Public Law 108-276: Project Bio Shield Act of 2004 
2005 -Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 
-REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302_requires state driver 
licenses and ID cards accepted for official purposes 
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 -Public Law 109-177: USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005 
 -Public Law 109-144: Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 
2006 -Public Law 109-366: Military Commissions Act of 2006 
 -Public Law 109-347: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 
 -Public Law 109-367: Secure Fence Act of 2006 
 -Public Law 109-476: Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006 
 -Public Law 109-374: Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
2007 -Public Law 110-182: 15-Day Extension of the Protect America Act of 2007 
 -Public Law 110-53: Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007 
 -Public Law 110-55: Protect America Act of 2007 
2010 -Public Law 111-140: Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act 
2011 -Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness 
 -Empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States. 
2012 -Safe Oklahoma Grant Program Created by Oklahoma Legislature through House 
Bill 3052 
 -Public Law 112-265: Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 
 -Public Law 112-168: Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2012 
 -Public Law 113-274: Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 
 -Public Law 113-282: National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 
 -Public Law 113-254: Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist 
Attacks Act of 2014 
2017 -Section 563 of the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Subtitle J, Secure 
Handling of Ammonium Nitrate ("Section 563"), Public Law 110–161 
  
Note. Table represents only policies or statutes identified. Additional policies may exist 
to address counter-terrorism efforts but were not specifically identified by researcher. 
 
The qualitative analysis process used presents the data as coded and interpreted by 
the researcher and therefore reflects the educational background, career experiences, and 
personal biases of the researcher in the context of the research questions. Future analysis 
of the historic documents by other researchers may be coded differently and provide 
alternate or additional insights. 
Results of Historic Review  
 Through a historic review of the bombing event, I identified several themes as 
they related to the original research question and two sub-questions. The predominant 
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theme focused on official roles and identifying authorities. Many of the challenges and 
barriers were characterized by the magnitude of the event and the limitations of training 
as it related to proper protocol. Several planning shortfalls emerged as Oklahoma City 
leaders responded to the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building. The most 
prominent shortfall was the lack of an emergency action plan that included considerations 
and appropriate response guidance for a catastrophic act of terrorism. At the time the 
local emergency response team included the Oklahoma City Police, Oklahoma City Fire 
Department, and the Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Their initial response was 
reactive. First responders knew that they had a responsibility to provide security and 
emergency recovery services. During chaos, they immediately went to work devoid of 
guidance or a coordinated plan. Following emergency response procedures designed for 
traditional emergencies, local officials notified the Oklahoma Department of Civil 
Emergency Management which triggered a series of crisis response efforts at the local, 
state, and federal levels (Winthrop, 1997). Representatives from the FBI were asked by 
the Oklahoma City Police Chief to take over the criminal investigation due to local police 
being overwhelmed with maintaining area security and controlling traffic in the area 
(Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996). As the recovery efforts 
continued throughout the day and following weeks, it was clear more comprehensive 
planning and coordination of emergency response efforts was needed. The lack of 
guidance and coordination resulted in a variety of early issues. The triage and 
transportation of victims was disorganized and chaotic (Maningas, Robison, and 
Mallonee, 1997). There was early confusion about who and how first responders were to 
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secure the building's structure while removing victims (Prendergast, 1995; Mlakar, 
Corley, Sozen, and Thornton, 1998; Osteraas, 2006). Phone services were inadequate to 
handle the high volume of communications traffic necessary for the coordination of 
response efforts. The target of the attack was a federal building requiring additional 
protocols that had to be followed to secure and preserve the crime scene. The additional 
structural damage and involvement of federal agencies complicated the recovery of 
victims in a timely manner (FEMA, 1996; Maningas, Robison, and Mallonee, 1997). In 
addition to the local volunteers who came to offer assistance, the high level of media 
attention drew volunteers and donations from across the U.S. The additional people and 
donated resources were difficult to manage and began to overwhelm existing staging 
areas and storage capacity (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 
1996).  
 Organizational successes were characterized by the level of collaboration that 
occurred between the various government agencies and the level of cooperation that was 
provided by nongovernmental organizations. The most prominent use of nongovernment 
services was the coordination between the State Medical Examiner's Office and the First 
Christian Church; designating the church’s property as the Family Assistance 
Center/Compassion Center to address the information requirements of immediate family 
members, while the local American Red Cross opened a shelter for individuals displaced 
by the explosion (The City of Oklahoma City, 1996; Oklahoma Department of Civil 
Emergency Management, 1996; FEMA, 1996; The City of Oklahoma City, 1996). Feed 
the Children, United Way, The Red Cross, and the Salvation Army were called upon for 
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logistics support and the distribution of food and disaster supplies. In addition, the 
Oklahoma Restaurant Association established 24-hour food services to feed emergency 
response workers (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996). 
Critical Incident Stress Debriefings and mental health services were provided by the 
Oklahoma City Fire and Police Departments, the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health 
and Substance Abuse Services, the FBI, the American Red Cross and additional volunteer 
private mental health specialists (FEMA, 1996; Bea, 1998).  
 In the aftermath, the Oklahoma Emergency Management Agency issued a formal 
report characterizing a list of lessons learned. Among those lessons, leaders indicated that 
a formalized emergency response planning effort was needed (FEMA, 1996). Resiliency 
appeared least among the themes and was characterized by the events and relationships 
that allowed the city to respond and recover. Those in charge of coordinating the 
recovery efforts indicated that many of the resources and expertise that was needed at the 
scene and in the early hours of recovery were not resident in or resourced by the 
government agencies but required resources to be pulled from the community, 
specifically private business and nongovernment organizations (FEMA, 1996). 
Participant Recruitment 
Through the initial literature review process, a list of government agencies that 
have traditionally had an active role in counter-terrorism strategies and emergency 
response efforts were identified. These roles were used to find government agencies in 
Oklahoma City that would reasonably have a similar role in planning and implementing a 
community level counter-terrorism strategy and any emergency response efforts. An 
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internet search engine was used to locate Oklahoma City government agencies and to 
identify key leaders in each agency. Names and contact details were collected for 
individuals identified as an administrator of a program or as a first responder. The 
literature review process also provided a list of unique skillsets and resources that have 
been recommended by counter-terrorism experts. An internet search engine was used to 
identify local Oklahoma City nongovernment agencies which provided specialized 
services or resources comparable to those recommended by the counter-terrorism 
literature. Names and contact details were collected for individuals identified as an 
administrator of a program or holding a leadership role within nongovernment 
organizations. Potential participants received an invitational email with instructions for 
initial consent and how to participate in the study. Participants who chose not to consent 
were thanked and no further contact was made. Participants who chose to consent were 
sent a follow-on email with the appropriate survey based on their government or 
nongovernment affiliation. Participants who completed the survey were thanked with the 
understanding that they would be re-contacted only if additional information was 
required for clarification of the initial responses. Email invitations were sent to 179 
potential participants with a request to reply with ‘consent’ or ‘decline’; 148 declined 
while 31 consented to participate. Of those whom declined, 27 indicated that they did not 
feel that they were a good fit for the study due to not working in an organization or 
position that addressed terrorism issues. Those who consented included 28 individuals in 
both government and nongovernment positions who are working directly with emergency 
planning or have current or past experiences with counter-terrorism efforts. Three of the 
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nongovernment participants have not had experience with current emergency planning or 
counter-terrorism experience, however they expressed interest in having their 
organization participate in the study due to the population they serve. Six interviews were 
conducted, and 25 surveys were completed and returned. 
Table 5 
 
Summary of Study Participants Characteristics 
Participants N Organization Type Role in 
Organization 
Years in 
Org 
City Official 2 Government Leadership 3, 6 
City Official 1 Government Staff 5 
First Responder 1 Government Management 6 
First Responder 3 Government Staff 6, 13, 15 
Medical/Hospital 1 Nongovernment Leadership 3 
Medical/Hospital 2 Nongovernment Staff 2, 16 
Mental Health 1 Government Staff 8 
Community Org/Public 
Service 
5 Nongovernment Leadership 2, 5, 5, 16, 
23 
Community Org/Public 
Service 
3 Nongovernment  Staff 5, 6, 16 
Education/University 1 Nongovernment Leadership 8 
Education/University 3 Nongovernment Staff 2, 9, 9 
Education/Primary/Seco
ndary 
0 Nongovernment Leadership na 
Community 
Education/Historic  
3 Nongovernment Leadership 10, 13, 22 
Religious Org 3 Nongovernment Leadership 1, 8, 27 
Private Business 2 Nongovernment Leadership 7, 12 
Total Participants 31    
Note. For confidentiality purposes, generalized roles are listed in lieu of the participants’ 
names and current professional titles. 
 
Survey/Interview Data Collection 
Each volunteer participant was sent a copy of the survey questions via email. 
Those who had been identified as government employees were sent survey questions 
designed to illicit information from the perspective of a government agency (see Annex 
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B). Those who had been identified as nongovernment employees were sent survey 
questions designed to illicit information from the perspective of a nongovernment 
community organization (see Annex C). Each volunteer participant was asked to 
complete the self-paced structured survey and return completed surveys via email or to 
participate in two 30-minute phone interviews with the researcher. Completed surveys 
were returned by 25 participants within two weeks of initial contact. Six volunteers chose 
to participate in a phone interview and provided a date and time in which they could be 
available for contact. Each participant was contacted by the researcher according to the 
date and time that was requested. Participants were provided a short introduction 
regarding the purpose of the study and the expectations of the researcher. All questions 
and concerns were addressed and noted prior to the first interview question. The 
interviews followed the same structure and content as the survey documents. 
Interviewees were encouraged to answer each question to the extent that they were 
comfortable with. At the completion of each answer the transcript was read back to the 
interviewee to ensure that the researcher had captured the information accurately. Each 
phone interview took an average of 30 minutes to answer the structured survey questions. 
Participants provided adequate answers that met the research criteria for each survey 
question. A second call was not utilized due to the sufficiency of initial interview 
responses. 
Analysis Process 
Data collected through a structured survey process and data collected from 
individual interviews was compiled and analyzed using a four-step process. The analysis 
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process started with an initial reading of responses to determine if additional information 
was needed from the participant. Next a systematic indexing process was used to apply 
thematic codes to the raw data. Coded data was further analyzed and arranged 
chronologically according a predetermined thematic framework that separated 
government agency and nongovernment organizational trends. The final step in the data 
analysis process included the cross-referencing of survey data and interview transcripts 
against selected historic records to identify divergent concepts and time sensitive trends. 
(Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014; Saldana, 2016). The analysis of data was 
recorded using a thick description research process to ensure that qualitative data was 
captured and interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible 
(Finlay, 2012). Survey results were reviewed for accuracy and loaded into Atlas.ti 8.0 
qualitative data software management system. Each survey was coded independently 
allowing statements to be coded inductively without generating cross-relationships to 
other data in the survey. Generalized themes emerged through the analyses of the coded 
data. Inter-relationships were examined and assessed across groups of participants. 
Findings and Key Themes 
Results of structured survey and interview data varied slightly between individual 
participants based on their role within their organizations, personal experiences, and 
amount of time in the organization, the level of involvement in current emergency 
planning efforts and their knowledge of existing counter-terrorism efforts in their 
community at the time of the survey. Each survey response was reviewed, and common 
words and phrases were highlighted and used to create a simple coding framework. 
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The number of government volunteers was less than originally planned but those 
that provided information were happy to help with the research project and provided 
insight regarding ongoing community outreach efforts in Oklahoma City. Government 
survey responses reflected a general understanding of counter-terrorism planning within 
the context of traditional community level emergency response requirements. Awareness 
of terrorism threats was high among those surveyed, either due to Oklahoma City's 
history or the abundance of recent events and the level of media attention surrounding 
global terrorism in the preceding months. The increased public attention may have also 
positively or negatively, influenced the volunteers' willingness to participate in the survey 
and the level of details within the responses provided. A copy of each government survey 
was entered in an Atlas-ti 8.0 software and auto coded against pre-determined codes 
drawn from the initial survey review. The most prevalent theme for each survey question 
was included in the following table. Each survey response was analyzed to determine 
whether the participants felt that the question's topic was important to their community's 
emergency response planning and long-term resiliency. Responses were further analyzed 
to determine whether each participant perceived the topic as having a positive or negative 
impact on their planning processes and the services they provide. Finally, each response 
was analyzed to determine how much effort and funding each participant felt their 
organization was willing to invest in addressing the question's topic. The importance of 
each theme represents knowledge of/or perception of topic rated on a Likert scale with 
1=very important, 3= indifferent, 5= not important. Sentiment is similarly measured 
1=positive, 3 neutral, 5=negative. Investment represents knowledge of/or perception of 
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resources allotted (e.g. personnel or funding) 1=high, 3=average, 5=low. The following 
table reflects a summary of compiled survey responses with respective ratings. 
Table 6 
 
Survey Results for Government Leaders 
N=8 Surveys/Interviews 
 Dominant 
Perception 
Importance Sentiment Investment 
RQ1_G Official role/responsibility 1 1 1 
RQ2_G One of many requirements 1 1 3 
RQ3_G Underutilized opportunity 3 3 3 
RQ4_G Considered but not 
formalized 
1 3 3 
RQ5_G Included in normal 
emergency planning  
1 1 3 
RQ6_G Equal to other emergency 
planning efforts 
1 1 5 
RQ7_G Could be improved 1 1 5 
     
Note. See appendix A for government survey questions. 
 
Nongovernmental survey responses reflected a slightly lower level of 
understanding regarding counter-terrorism planning requirements within community 
level emergency response plans. However, an awareness of terrorism and the importance 
of having a community wide plan was high among those surveyed and may account for a 
higher level of willingness among nongovernmental organizations to volunteer for the 
study. The participants in the nongovernment group represent a greater level of diversity 
in both the types of organizations they work in and the amount of time they have worked 
for the organizations. Survey responses for nongovernmental participants were analyzed 
using a similar coding process. The importance of each theme represents knowledge of/or 
perception of topic rated on a Likert scale with 1=very important, 3= indifferent, 5= not 
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important. Sentiment is similarly measured 1=positive, 3 neutral, 5=negative. Investment 
represents knowledge of/or perception of resources allotted (e.g. personnel or funding) 
1=high, 3=average, 5=low. The following table reflects a summary of the compiled 
nongovernment survey responses with respective ratings. 
Table 7 
 
Survey Results for Nongovernment Leaders 
N=23 Surveys/Interviews 
 Dominant 
Perception 
Importance Sentiment Investment 
RQ1_NG Services provided 1 1 1 
RQ2_NG Security/law 
enforcement related 
3 1 3 
RQ3_NG Can be increased 1 1 5 
RQ4_NG Other areas of 
community 
1 1 5 
RQ5_NG Primarily recovery 
efforts 
1 1 3 
RQ6_NG Improving over last few 
years 
1 1 3 
RQ7_NG Independent programs 1 1 3 
     
Note. See appendix B for nongovernment survey questions. 
 
The following table reflects a summary of themes drawn from a compilation of 
both government and nongovernment survey and interview responses. A copy of each 
survey was up-loaded in Atlas.ti 8.0 software and auto coded against the pre-determined 
criteria drawn from the initial survey review. The most prevalent themes were included in 
the following table along with a generalized perception based upon the context in which 
the theme appears in the survey data. 
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Table 8 
 
Summary of Survey Responses 
N=31 Surveys/Interviews 
Coded Theme Perception 
Official Roles Participants indicated a high level of responsibility for 
providing services designed to improve public safety.  
Unofficial Roles Leaders felt that it was important for them to ensure 
their staff had the proper training and to provide the 
resources needed within their specific agencies.   
Organizational Successes Organizations felt that they were implementing lessons 
learned from previous events and continued to seek 
opportunities to prepare their staff for unexpected 
events. 
Organizational Challenges Many of the challenges were the result of poor 
planning and a lack of funding for the resources they 
needed. 
Personal Successes Several participants indicated that they felt their 
organization had the knowledge and ability to provide 
adequate services in times of need. 
Personal Challenges When looking specifically at preventing terrorism, 
leaders felt that they personally lack appropriate 
training and sufficient guidance from their senior 
leaders to be effective at their job. 
Collaboration Most felt that collaboration with outside agencies and 
community organizations would be very valuable 
during planning. Role and responsibilities would need 
to be clearly communicated and adhered to during an 
event. 
Communication Two-way communication was a high priority for 
government participants. Most indicated that have good 
communication lines between agencies and with staff 
was critical for passing accurate information and 
executing an effective plan. 
Miscommunication Communication barriers were cited as the most 
frustrating and had the potential to disrupt emergency 
response efforts or cause additional injury.  
Barriers Participants indicated that existing barriers needed to 
be identified early and addressed in planning so that 
alternate options would be in place if needed. 
  
Note. Thematic analysis of survey data using Atlas.ti Qualitative Data Analysis (8.0). 
software. Coded themes (10) represent the most prominent concepts drawn from the 
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initial literature review process. Perceptions describe the context in which the themes 
appear in the compiled survey data as it relates to both government and nongovernment 
roles. 
 
General themes drawn from the survey data demonstrated a high level of personal 
satisfaction with the official and unofficial roles the participants fill within their agencies 
and organizations. Despite differences in levels of authority and responsibility, 
participants' responses indicated a level of personal responsibility for promoting public 
safety, supporting colleagues and contributing to overall community well-being. 
Interview participants were enthusiastic about the study topic and provided detailed 
answers to the survey questions. Coded survey data produced 10 distinct themes relevant 
to the three research questions. Communication was the most prominent theme that 
appeared in the survey responses. References to communication included the importance 
of keeping lines of communication open between various government agencies and 
nongovernment organizations that the participants had worked with in the past. Two 
themes, Personal challenges and Barriers, appeared in both sub-questions as they related 
to the sufficiency of the participants training. Collaboration was a more frequent theme 
among the nongovernment responses and often was conveyed as a positive activity. 
There was greater resistance to collaboration within the government responses. Negative 
perceptions of collaboration where characterized by the need to maintain an official 
capacity with proper authorities. Barriers that hindered or prevented collaboration with 
experts were characterized as primarily ethical or legal bounds that participants were 
uncomfortable with. Organizational success appeared predominately in the main research 
question, characterized by the degree to which each participant identified their agency or 
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organization as having a broader community role then the primary service they provided. 
The survey structure allowed participants to provide additional information as 
appropriate. Several participants highlighted other community initiatives in Oklahoma 
City that they were aware of or affiliated with outside of their employment. The 
following table reflects the projects identified by participants. Additional community 
projects may exist to address counter-terrorism efforts but were not specifically identified 
within the survey and interview data. 
Table 9 
 
Summary of Community Projects 
Project Focus Area/Target Audience 
-The Oklahoma City Police Bilingual Unit 
was formed in 2003 
-Promotes the hiring of multi-lingual 
officers and provides language translation 
services for non-English speaking 
members of community 
-Oklahoma City Office of Emergency 
Management (OKC OEM) 
-Coordination of government and non-
profit relief organizations during an 
emergency 
-Family Awareness and Community 
Teamwork (FACT) 
-Gang prevention program for youth ages 
10-17 
-Police Community Relations (PCR) Unit -Focuses on building relationships with 
neighborhood associations, businesses, 
churches, and other community groups 
-Strong Neighborhoods Initiative -Government sponsored initiative to 
leverage private investment from families, 
developers and businesses to improve 
neighborhoods in their own communities 
-Continuum of Care grants -Provides services to homeless individuals 
and families to promote self-sustainment 
and social stability 
  
Note. Table represents projects identified. Additional details regarding focus area/target 
audience have been supplemented with publicly available data drawn from the 
organizations' websites.  
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Many of the projects identified by participants were not specifically designed to 
address counter-terrorism issues, however, ongoing terrorism research indicates that 
community programs addressing some of the underlying social issues can shape an 
individual's behavior in positive ways and therefore each of the listed programs and 
others in the community are worth further study for their long-term impact on counter-
terrorism efforts and for building community resiliency. 
Results of Case Study 
A qualitative case study model provided an opportunity to draw upon 20 years of 
historic data and identify trending patterns as they relate to counter-terrorism planning 
and community resiliency efforts (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014). The 
availability of data related to the Oklahoma City bombing is extensive and provides an 
opportunity to examine multiple perspectives from individuals and agencies that were 
directly impacted by the event or had a role in implementing new process as a result of 
the 1995 bombing event. The second part to the study drew upon the experiences of 31 
voluntary participants associated with government agencies or nongovernment 
organizations in the Oklahoma City area. Of those who consented to participate, 25 
volunteered to fill out a structure survey, while six volunteered to participate in a phone 
interview with the researcher. Results of the historic review combined with the insights 
provided by the study participants answered the original research questions and presented 
several themes regarding lessons learned and opportunities for improvement throughout 
the planning and execution phases of a counter-terrorism strategy. 
Research Question 
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In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and 
nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint counter 
terrorism services? 
Data drawn from the records highlighted cross-agency coordination as an area 
that needed improvement following the 1995 terrorist attack. An analysis of historic 
records revealed that Oklahoma City government and nongovernment agencies did not 
collaborate with one another to provide joint counter-terrorism services before the attack 
or during the early hours of the rescue and recovery efforts. Following the attack, 
designated government agencies worked with local nongovernment agencies to provide 
medical and mental health services, but additional counter-terrorism programs were 
assumed by law enforcement agencies.  
Compilation of the historic data generated 26 distinct themes related to the 
primary research question and two sub-questions. Official roles and communication 
appeared with the highest frequency within the data sets. Maintaining adequate 
communication networks and the management of resources, volunteers, and donations 
were cited as the most problematic coordination challenges. Official roles were noted 
prominently within the data set and were characterized by the level of authority held as it 
related to providing security and the recovery of victims. The Oklahoma Department of 
Civil Emergency Management took the lead on documenting the lessons learned. The 
most evident barriers were characterized by a lack of training as it related to managing 
response and recovery efforts after a catastrophic terrorist attack. National and regional 
integrated training needed to take place between federal, state and local emergency 
112 
 
management services, to include fire and law enforcement services. Managing the 
consequences of terrorism incidents was not included in the emergency response plans 
and was not well understood across the government agencies prior to the bombing. 
(Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996). 
Collaboration was associated with blame within the prominent themes and 
characterized by the extended amount of time and effort it took to coordinate basic 
communication networks and the management of resources. Government agencies relied 
on both nongovernmental organizations and the local business community to provide 
specialized services. Cellular phones and dedicated lines for provided by a commercial 
company when the emergency communications systems were disrupted by the explosion. 
Construction equipment was needed to assist in the removal of debris and to provide 
structural support during the recovery process. Medical triage and mental health services 
were provided by local nongovernment organizations. Food, water, and temporary 
shelters were provided by various nongovernment organizations and private businesses in 
the community. City leaders noted, "There were literally thousands of items, ranging 
from specialized search and rescue equipment to hard-hats, which appeared in Oklahoma 
City from around the world. Numerous problems were experienced with the management 
and storage of these resources and donated goods" (The City of Oklahoma City, 1996). 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also noted the need for a formal 
management process to be in place prior to an event. "The management of donations was 
an overwhelming task which would be improved in the future by implementation of the 
FEMA Donations Management System." (FEMA, 1996). In addition to donations, the 
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management of volunteers put an additional strain on the recovery process. Community 
response also appeared frequently within the compiled historic data and was 
characterized by both shock and the subsequent compassion that was provided to the 
victims. "The Red Cross was overwhelmed by the magnitude of spontaneous volunteers 
who came to the chapter to help. Some volunteers traveled considerable distances, only to 
find out their services were not needed" (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency 
Management, 1996). 
Through the historic review process, 26 distinct themes were generated. Themes 
were characterized by the resources, official roles and services involved in the emergency 
response and recovery efforts following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. A survey of 
current community leaders was also conducted to gain a better understanding of how the 
lessons learned in 1995 have been adopted over time and if they have been considered 
within current counter-terrorism strategies. The analysis of data drawn from the survey 
process generated 10 distinct themes as they related to the initial research question and 
two sub-questions. A compilation of the survey data indicated that most Oklahoma City 
leaders were aware of the need to integrate with other government agencies as they 
conduct emergency management planning. Several participants identified agencies and 
organizations that they had work with on a regular basis but were more hesitant about 
reaching out to nongovernment organizations for specialized training or assistance as it 
related to counter-terrorism strategies. Most of the interagency work was related to 
traditional emergency response planning for natural disasters but all the government 
participants agreed that counter-terrorism was a topic frequently discussed in their office. 
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Government participants were less confident about their agencies’ interactions with the 
local non-profit community during the planning process but indicated that several 
services needed after an attack would likely come from a nongovernment organization 
such as the Red Cross or local church organizations. Government employees were less 
likely to identify mental health services or hospitals as being nongovernment, grouping 
theses services in with the emergency services provided by local police, fire and 
ambulance services.  
There was greater diversity among the nongovernmental participants, both in 
occupation and in their understanding of their role within a counter-terrorism strategy. 
Participants who provided a medical or mental health service were more likely to have 
coordinated with government agencies. Those who lead or provided services through a 
religious organization were less likely to collaborate with government agencies on 
counter-terrorism strategies but more likely to collaborate with government agencies that 
provided welfare assistance and public health services. Participants leading religious 
organizations admitted that most of their community work was done within their own 
congregation or with other nongovernment organizations in the community. Any 
humanitarian efforts following a disaster were coordinated by individuals within the 
congregations, but these activities were not something the churches traditionally 
sponsored or participated in.   
Sub-questions were included in the study to explore the types of services 
nongovernment organization could provide within a comprehensive counter-terrorism 
strategy and to capture any efforts designed to build resilient communities.  
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Sub-Question 1  
What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organizations 
provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address 
ideologically based security threats? 
Government participants acknowledged the value in having community experts 
provide advice and training but demonstrated a level of resistance to having community 
leaders involved in the actual emergency planning meetings. Official roles were 
characterized by the potential ethical issues and legal bounds that are involved in 
coordinating with religious leaders or cultural experts. One government leader indicated 
that if outside services or training were needed these organizations would be contacted by 
the appropriate government agency and services would be coordinated at that time.  
Nongovernment participants were slightly more open to the idea of outside 
experts providing training or assistance to government leaders. Several nongovernment 
participants felt that it would be helpful to be involved in the early stages of counter-
terrorism planning so that they had an opportunity to identify their roles and the services 
that they may be able to provide. Collaboration was paired with themes related to 
effective communication and characterized by frequent interaction starting at the earliest 
stages of planning. Organizations that provide medical or mental health services felt that 
they should be involved at every level of planning and their services should be included 
in a comprehensive recovery plan.  
Government leaders were not as comfortable with expanding their collaboration 
with additional community organizations. Some felt that outside organizations might 
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have their own agendas and may not agree with some of the security and counter-
terrorism programs being funded in the community. One participant was adamant stating, 
“These decisions should be made by government leaders with the authority to do so.” The 
compilation of survey responses reflected a consensus regarding a nongovernment 
organization’s ability to provide specialized advice or training regarding ideological 
security threats but there was not consensus on the level of involvement a nongovernment 
organization should have within counter-terrorism planning efforts. These sentiments 
were assigned as barriers and characterized as limitation of policy, funding or staffing. 
The second sub-question was designed to address the needs of minority 
populations in a community; specifically, populations with unique cultural or language 
needs that may impact a counter-terrorism strategy or any recovery efforts.  
Sub-Question 2 
In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment 
agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural and 
multi-lingual needs? 
Organizational success was characterized by a perception that lessons learned had 
been incorporated in current programs. Government participants readily identified the 
Oklahoma City Police Department as having a multi-lingual program but indicated that it 
only met the needs of a few languages and was not as comprehensive as it could be. All 
government participants indicated that having multi-cultural and multi-lingual training 
would be useful to their agency but only one participant indicated that they have worked 
with community leaders to address the cultural needs of their clients. Challenges were 
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characterized as insufficient training and a lack of funding designated to counter-
terrorism requirements. Several participants indicated that they would like to expand their 
staff training to include more multi-cultural awareness and ensure the needs of these 
populations are included in their emergency response plans.  
Nongovernment organizations provided similar responses, indicating that they 
often rely on multi-lingual staff to address some of the more diverse populations but also 
indicated that it was difficult to find staff with adequate translation skills for some of the 
uncommon languages. Local colleges and universities were identified as having language 
programs, with one participant indicating that some of the instructors or students might 
be able to assist with language translation in the event of an emergency. Consensus 
among both government and nongovernment participants revealed that multi-cultural and 
multi-lingual training would help leaders understand the needs of non-English speaking 
members of their community.   
The case study was designed to examine one event and a single community's 
response. The results of the historic review combined with the survey data represent the 
findings and perceptions as they relate to Oklahoma City and may not be generalizable to 
other terrorist attacks or other populations. Despite these limitations, the insight gained 
answered the research questions and provided additional information for community 
leaders to draw upon. The study also identified elements of counter-terrorism planning 
that need to be improved indicating that future research at the community level is needed. 
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Summary 
A qualitative case study model provided an opportunity to draw upon 20 years of 
historic data, identifying trending patterns that have shaped counter-terrorism planning 
and community resiliency efforts in Oklahoma City, OK. Findings from the historic 
review and survey data helped answer the research questions and presented validate 
observations and unique perceptions from members of the Oklahoma City community 
regarding the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and its impact on 
the development of counter-terrorism strategies today. The results of the case study as 
they relate to a broader understanding of counter-terrorism research that supports 
community level engagement are provided in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Recommendations, and Implications 
Introduction 
Domestic terrorism has placed a tremendous burden on the law enforcement and 
crisis response services in U.S. communities. Despite years of additional funding and 
new counterterrorism policies, the threat of domestic terrorism remains. Increased 
mobility and advancements in communication technologies allows individuals and 
organizations to share, recruit, and act upon ideological grievances with greater ease. The 
purpose of conducting a qualitative case study at the community level was to develop a 
more comprehensive understanding of how U.S. communities are preparing for and 
responding to acts of domestic terrorism. Exploring collaboration efforts between 
governmental agencies (leaders, first responders) and nongovernment organizations 
(educational institutes, religious institutes, specialty think tanks, and aid organizations) in 
Oklahoma City provided insight on best practices regarding the design and 
implementation of community level, counterterrorism strategies.  
In Chapter 5, I discuss how the study results answer the initial research questions 
and what contributions these finding add to the existing counter-terrorism literature. 
Based on this new understanding, recommendations are provided regarding how the 
research might be used by government agencies and nongovernmental organizations as 
they address counter-terrorism issues in their communities and build upon existing 
programs to increase community resiliency. 
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Interpretation of Findings 
Through the literature review process, several unique insights were identified that 
have emerged within the last few years as terrorism and counterterrorism research has 
matured. Despite the increased focus on studying terrorism, it remains one of the most 
challenging security issues today. Unlike traditional academic topics, counterterrorism 
researchers are tasked to produce actionable recommendations used to inform national 
security policies, create counter-terrorism strategies, and develop comprehensive 
programs to deradicalize or build community resiliency (Brannan and Strindberg, 2014). 
Complicated by a lack of a common definition, terrorism research spans multiple 
disciplines creating various levels of understanding and disjointed recommended 
solutions. Despite nearly 50 years of academic research on the topic, the undisciplined 
process of crossing academic fields of study has not produced a significant amount of 
empirical studies for practitioners to draw upon. Most of terrorism research is based on 
secondhand data and sociological trends. Berger’s and Luckman (1966), posited that 
humans create their own systems of meaning in which they begin to understand their 
world through their individual experiences and respond in accordance with their own 
interpretation of what may be a shared event within a social setting (Babbie, 2015). Based 
on this research many experts in the field of counter-terrorism believe that human 
behaviors can be shaped by positive social influencers (Abbas and Siddique, 2012; Alam 
and Husband, 2013; Bhui, Everitt, and Jones, 2014). With this understanding, addressing 
the underlying causes of terroristic behavior may be a very long process that may need to 
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include a variety of community level programs (White House, 2011a; United States 
Department of State, 2013; DHS, 2017). 
With a case study design, combining social constructivism theory with systems 
thinking theory, I created a flexible research framework to explore the individual 
experiences and interpretations of a shared domestic terrorist event (Thomas, 2015; Van 
Mane, 2015). Participating leaders demonstrated an understanding of the challenges they 
face in their own community and agreed that preventing terrorism and creating counter-
terrorism strategies is very difficult. For these reasons, many communities have not 
invested the time or money in counter-terrorism planning efforts or in comprehensive 
long-term programs. For others it is a matter of priority due to budget shortfalls. The 
threat of terrorism may remain a low priority in the mind of leaders until they are 
required to deal with the aftermath. Communities that have experienced terrorism first 
hand seem to place a slightly higher priority on their counter-terrorism and law 
enforcement programs and have made an effort to seek federal assistance and grant 
funding to increase their community's security measures (DHS, 2015a; 2015b). 
Understanding which resources are needed, what funding is available and which 
resources already exist in their community, remains a challenge for those charged with 
planning counterterrorism strategies and providing for emergency response services. To 
increase awareness regarding ongoing counterterrorism efforts at the community level, 
the research focused on three questions designed to illicit best practices and lessons 
learned from the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. 
Research Question 
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In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and 
nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint counter-
terrorism services? 
To address this question, I analyzed historical records associated with the 1995 
Oklahoma City Bombing and revealed that Oklahoma City government and 
nongovernment agencies did not collaborate with one another to provide joint 
counterterrorism services before the attack or during the early hours of the rescue and 
recovery efforts. Following the attack, designated government agencies worked with 
local nongovernment agencies to provide medical and mental health services, but 
additional counterterrorism programs were assumed by law enforcement agencies rather 
than creating joint collaborative counterterrorism services.  
Terrorism and counterterrorism research indicates that there are several 
underlying factors that contribute to the recruitment, development, and participation of 
individuals who engage in terrorism (Abbas, and Siddique, 2012; Speckhard, 2012). To 
create effective counterterrorism strategies, prevention and de-radicalization programs 
must be included. Many of the psychological and social factors that have been identified 
as potential drivers of terrorist behavior need to be addressed in an integrated and 
systematic manner. Several agencies and organizations with specialized services will be 
required over an extended period (e.g. mental health, educational institutes, language and 
cultural experts, family services, etc.) (White House, 2011a, 2011b).  
Analysis of themes drawn from the historical data set indicate that the initial 
emergency response plan was insufficient for responding to a terrorist attack. As first 
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responders arrived on the scene, they proceeded to rescue the victims without fully 
evaluating the situation or determining if a second attack was imminent. The Oklahoma 
City Police Department assumed the initial coordination authority, securing the area until 
a further evaluation could take place. Over the course of the first several hours more 
formalized roles and cooperative relationships between rescue services developed. 
Government agencies began to identify their individual authorities and coordinate the 
recovery of victims in an organized and timely manner. Assigning the primary security 
and coordination role to the Oklahoma City Police Department provided a central 
coordinating body in early hours but this arrangement was not specified in existing 
emergency plans and did cause some early confusion as additional first response teams 
arrived on the scene. As the city, state and federal agencies arrived at the scene a more 
formalized recovery plan was needed to address a variety of issue including, (a) the 
structural damage, (b) protect the crime scene, (c) coordinate the triage and transportation 
of multiple victims, (d) recover the bodies, (e)manage the media, (f) coordinate the 
resources, (g) manage the donations and volunteers, (h) provide food and shelter for the 
displaced, and (i) maintain the safety and security of the community.  
The historic data associated with the Oklahoma City Bombing demonstrated that 
a significant amount of coordination between government agencies and various 
community organizations took place throughout the recovery efforts but very few of 
those efforts were categorized as part of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy or 
emergency response plan (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 
1996). In the aftermath as individuals returned to their day jobs, the lessons learned 
124 
 
regarding emergency response were adequately documented but there were very few 
recommendations regarding the establishment of long-term counter-terrorism programs 
or designed to build community resiliency against future terrorist threats. The only 
references to long-term resiliency were included in data regarding the continuation of 
mental health services for victims and first responders (Tucker, Pfefferbaum, Nitiéma, 
Wendling, and Brown, 2016). 
Research indicates that there are several underlying factors that contribute to the 
recruitment, development, and participation of individuals when it comes to terrorism 
(Spalek, and Davies, 2012; Speckhard, 2012). Many of these factors need to be addressed 
in an integrated and systematic manner by several different agencies and organizations 
with expertise and special skill sets (e.g. mental health, educational institutes, language 
and cultural experts, family services, etc.) (White House, 2011a, 2011b) Two examples 
of current research include O’Sullivan, Kuziemsky, Toal-Sullivan and Corneil (2013) 
which found that the development of several interdependent connections in a community, 
promotes greater health resiliency throughout a disaster, in the period of recovery, and 
after a traumatic event. Their research suggests that these community networks are more 
effective if they are created and maintained prior to an emergency event (O’Sullivan, 
Kuziemsky, Toal-Sullivan and Corneil, 2013). In a second study, Robinson, Murphy, and 
Bies, (2014) found that early collaborative relationships between schools and nonprofit 
organizations such as the Red Cross can be effective in preparing for disasters and help 
schools address any concerns prior to an emergency event ensuring that school staff are 
aware of emergency management resources. 
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Despite all the historic knowledge and academic research available to Oklahoma 
City leaders, the survey findings indicate that the counter-terrorism planning efforts in 
Oklahoma City have not fully engaged the nongovernment organizations within the 
community to provide joint services. Among the 10 themes generated by a compilation of 
survey data, personal perceptions regarding official roles and potential legal barriers 
prevented government agencies from fully engaging nongovernment services within a 
counter-terrorism strategy to provide joint services. Communication was also cited as a 
barrier for nongovernment organizations. Many of the organizations who participated 
lacked an understanding of how they might engage in a counter-terrorism planning 
process. Survey data did not identify any collaborative efforts between government 
agencies and nongovernment agencies regarding the implementation of counter-terrorism 
joint services. 
Sub-Question 1  
What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organizations 
provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address 
ideologically based security threats? 
A compilation and analysis of historic records did not provide adequate data to 
answer sub-question 1. Analysis of survey data generated 10 themes that captured 
generalized perceptions regarding the research questions. Organization success was 
characterized as implementing lessons learned. Within the data set, “increased staff 
knowledge regarding ideological threats” was represented as a strength and ethical or 
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legal concerns was presented as weaknesses or impediments to inviting nongovernment 
organizations provide education, information or advice to government leaders. Reaching 
out to nongovernmental organizations to provide education, information, and advice was 
difficult for the study's government participants to fully embrace. There was consensus 
regarding nongovernment organizations having the right expertise but there was also 
hesitancy and disagreement as to how outside experts would engage within a counter-
terrorism strategy. Some of the participants indicated that there may be political or legal 
ramification that needed to be considered prior to reaching out to experts. These concerns 
were not unfounded; the creation of counter-terrorism strategies can create ethical 
concerns and test the boundaries of legislation designed to protect human rights (DOJ, 
2010; Vale, 2014; Whittaker, 2014). Rather than avoiding interaction with various 
nongovernment experts or religious leaders, government agencies have an opportunity to 
learn about diverse populations and create more inclusive community programs (Muslim 
Public Affairs Council, 2014). 
Nongovernment data demonstrated a clear understanding of the significance of 
collaboration, however, a few of the responses also indicated that the participant was not 
confident about how they or their organization would participate in community 
emergency planning efforts or how their organization could support local government 
leaders in the event of a terrorist threat or an actual terrorist event. Individuals working in 
educational positions focused more heavily on sharing information and the learning 
aspects of a collaborative relationship. Individuals working in private business or 
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working in a non-profit that provided a specialized service were more willing to reach out 
to government leaders if they felt that the service could help in recovery efforts. 
Organizations who focused specifically on community programs such as youth 
leaders or religious organizations were more likely to say they did not feel their 
organization should be involved in counter-terrorism planning or did not see a role in 
such planning for their organizations. These perceptions were consistent with some of the 
feelings expressed by government leaders as they related to religious organizations, 
however, counter-terrorism literature disagrees. Several recent studies support and 
encourage the use of experts or religious leaders to provide ideological and cultural 
training or to provide advice and inform community level counter-terrorism strategies 
(DOJ, 2010, Bures, 2013; Cheema, Scheyvens, Glavovic, and Imran, 2014). Due to the 
complexity involved in understanding the motivation behind terrorist acts, seeking the 
advice of experts becomes critical. A study by Thomsen, Obaidi, Sheehy-Skeffington, 
Kteily, & Sidanius (2014) found that differences in social constructs and belief systems 
allow individuals and groups to be more or less supportive of terrorism. By understanding 
how a specific culture or ethnic group interprets their place in a community and how they 
interpret terrorism as a viable method for shaping political outcomes, leaders may be able 
to adjust policies or create programs to address the needs of these communities. The 
creation of a counter-narrative has also been identified as an effective strategy for 
addressing radicalization (Braddock and Horgan, 2016). To be effective, counter-
narratives and the communication plans used to distribute counter-narratives should be 
informed by experts to ensure the proper message is relayed. 
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Review of the study results identified several self-imposed constraints in which 
Oklahoma City leaders were not comfortable in seeking expert advice regarding 
ideological threats. The historic data regarding the Oklahoma City attack, did not provide 
an adequate amount of detailed information about government engagement with experts 
or nongovernmental organizations to fully answer sub-question 1. Survey data provided a 
few examples of ongoing community outreach that indicate the community is working to 
address informational shortfalls regarding ideological differences and partially answered 
sub-question 1. However, the analysis of data did not demonstrate a high level of 
engagement between government and nongovernment experts in the local community 
regarding the exchange of information, training, or advice related to ideologically based 
security threats. 
Sub-Research Question 2 
In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment 
agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural and 
multi-lingual needs? 
A compilation and analysis of historic records did not provide adequate data to 
answer sub-question 2. Analysis of survey data generated 10 themes capturing 
generalized perceptions regarding the research questions. Organization success was 
characterized as implementing lessons learned as they relate to sub-question 2. Within the 
data set, the Oklahoma City Police Department was identified as having a multi-lingual 
recruitment and training program to address the multi-lingual needs in the community. 
Only meeting the needs of a few languages and not being comprehensive or widespread 
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were identified as barriers. A review of the survey data indicated that having multi-
cultural and multi-lingual training would be useful but only one participant indicated that 
they have worked with community leaders to address the cultural needs of their clients. 
Unofficial roles were characterized by statements regarding the care and training of 
colleagues and staff. Several participants indicated that they would like to expand their 
staff training to include more multi-cultural awareness and ensure the needs of diverse 
populations are included in their emergency response plans. Analysis of nongovernment 
data also indicated that organizations often rely on multi-lingual staff to address some of 
the more diverse populations but also indicated that it was difficult to find staff with 
adequate translation skills for some of the uncommon languages. 
Addressing cultural needs and language barriers in counter-terrorism planning is 
recommended throughout the terrorism and counter-terrorism literature Wickes, R., 
Zahnow, White, and Mazerolle (2014) found that ethnic differences influence how 
individuals interact and engage with their community. To assimilate fully in a 
community, individuals need to feel valued as a community member (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2012; Basuchoudhary and Cotting, 2014). Including ethnically 
diverse populations in the planning stages and addressing their needs during an 
emergency event improves their ability to integrate and become a productive member of 
the community (DHS, 2015b; Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2014). Compiled survey 
data indicated support for nongovernment and private organizations providing specialized 
knowledge, unique language skillsets or additional cultural resources within community 
counter-terrorism plans. Several of the participants also indicated that their own 
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organizations would benefit from language assistance and cultural training with the 
leaders of non-English speaking populations in their community. Analysis of 
nongovernment data identified local colleges and universities as having language 
programs, with one participant indicating that some of the instructors or students might 
be able to assist with language translation in the event of an emergency. Consensus 
among both government and non-government participants revealed that multi-cultural 
and multi-lingual training would help leaders understand the needs of non-English 
speaking members of their community.  
The study results answered sub-question 2, identifying the Oklahoma Police 
Department’s multi-linguistic recruitment and training effort as a best practice in the 
community as it relates to addressing the needs of multi-cultural and multi-lingual 
members of the community. Additional language training programs were identified but 
were not directly connected to a counter-terrorism strategy.  
Since the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the threat and cost of domestic 
terroristic attacks continues to grow (Giesecke, Burns, Barrett, Bayrak, rose, Slovic, and 
Suher, 2012). Several U.S. communities still hold to the mistaken conviction that it will 
never happen in their back yard. For these communities, preparing for a terrorist attack 
seems unpalatable and excessively expensive. Today communities no longer have the 
options to ignore terrorism threats. Federal and state laws have mandated community 
level planning and counter-terrorism training in support of national security and 
homeland defense plans (DHS, 2017). Unfortunately, many state and local city budgets 
have not accounted for the additional requirements. Communities that have received 
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counter-terrorism funding, tend to invest in increased law enforcement and security 
measures rather than viewing the problem systematically and investing in the educational 
and community resiliency programs that have been identified in the current counter-
terrorism research. Since 2003 DHS has provided $36 billion in funding for state and 
local counter-terrorism efforts. The State of Oklahoma's Office of Homeland Security has 
received approximately $217 million in grant funding between the years of 1999 and 
2012. A large majority of that money has been spent to support various emergency 
response and law enforcement enhancements, while a very limited amount (approx. $2 
million) has been allocated to social and community-based programs that target the 
underlying behavioral issues and the social grievances that have been cited in the court 
records of convicted terrorists (State of Oklahoma, 2017) 
Limitations 
Terrorism and counter-terrorism is a very difficult topic for community leaders to 
discuss for various reasons. The most significant limitation of this study was that it is 
focused on a single mid-western community with a population of approximately 500,000; 
potentially limiting the transferability of the results to other communities. Despite 
sending 179 invitations to potential participants, a small percentage of the Oklahoma City 
community was willing to participate in the study and provide information about their 
organizations’ role in counter-terrorism planning. Without a larger portion of the 
community willing to participate in counter-terrorism research or willing to incorporate 
best practices in their own community planning efforts, the topic will remain under 
researched. The case study’s qualitative design and structured data collection 
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methodology only focused on publicly accessible data between 1995 and 2015, and on 
the personal accounts of voluntary study participants, limiting data sources to only 
information that was adequately recorded, made publicly available, or voluntarily 
provided. The results of the study provided a lot of historic data but due to the amount of 
time that had passed between the 1995 event and current counter-terrorism planning 
efforts, the initial lessons learned had all but fade into the archives. The final limitations 
of this study reflect the boundaries set by my personal biases as a result of my 
educational and professional career. These biases unintentionally influenced how the data 
was collected, which sources of data were chosen for inclusion and examination, and how 
the data was coded and interpreted in relation to the study questions. 
Recommendations  
Due to the persistent threat of terrorist activity at the local level, additional 
research and ongoing community level planning is essential. Much of the current research 
and lessons learned reside on government and university databases or have been buried 
within the local file systems owned by the respective emergency management agencies. It 
is critical for counter-terrorism research and lessons learned information to be shared 
with community leaders who create local policies, maintain community security, enforce 
existing laws and provide emergency response services (Ursano, Fullerton, and Norwood, 
2003; Fedorowicz, Sawyer, Williams, Markus, Dias, Tyworth, and Schrier, 2014; Valcik, 
and Tracy, 2017). In addition to having access to research and after-action information, 
there is a need to ensure that both government and nongovernment leaders understand 
which organizations in their communities have the resources and the special skill sets 
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needed to address counter-terrorism in a comprehensive and collaborative manner; to 
include meeting the needs of unique or underserved populations (Wickes, Zahnow, 
White, and Mazerolle, 2014; Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2014). 
Since September 11, 2001 there have been additional high-level terrorist attacks 
around the world. Protecting communities from future attacks requires extensive 
intelligence collection capabilities, additional law enforcement resources, and additional 
emergency response personnel and equipment to prevent and address each threat or event 
(White House, 2011b). In addition, nations are expending a tremendous amount of 
resources on securing their borders and fighting terrorist networks with military 
operations in foreign lands all to keep these networks in their home countries and prevent 
domestic terrorist events. Although these efforts are having an impact they are not a 
systematic solution. We must continue to prepare and strengthen our communities (White 
House, 2011a; Egli, 2013). Continuing to study these events through the lens of multiple 
disciplines will create a more comprehensive understanding of factors that have been 
shown to increase terroristic behavior (Wormeli, 2014). In addition, we need to expand 
our understanding of social programs that may address those factors at an early stage 
before individuals become disaffected and lash out at their community or before they 
become volunteers or recruitment targets for violent terrorist cells (Bergen, Hoffman, and 
Tiedemann, 2011; White House, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). 
Implications for Social Change  
Results of the study provide an opportunity for Oklahoma City to reflect on 
historic and current best practices as they relate to emergency management planning and 
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community resiliency. The choice to use a combination of social constructivism and 
systems thinking theories provided a flexible and comprehensive framework to collect 
and interpret the data. Using a thick description collection process also allowed the 
researcher to explore the historical records through the individual experiences and 
perceptions as they related to a shared community experience. This provided the 
researcher with an opportunity to gain a clearer picture of how each member of the 
community was initially impacted by the event and how they moved from victim to 
volunteer as the city recovered. The insight provided by each survey participant and the 
compiled observations identified best practices and some gaps in current collaborative 
relationships that will inform other communities that are dealing with their own terrorist 
event or those beginning the initial counter-terrorism planning stages. Promoting more 
dialogue at the community level and encouraging the community to get involved in a 
comprehensive plan that focuses on prevention, response, and healing will improve 
community resiliency and develop a sense of shared responsibility among the 
community’s citizens. Sharing the identified best practices and acknowledging the 
potential opportunities for improvement may also promote positive social change by 
assisting other communities as they build resiliency against ideological grievances and 
create their own community terrorism response plans. 
Conclusions 
After the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing the citizens came together to rescue and 
heal each other. Since that time, several terroristic events have occurred in various 
communities in the U.S. and around the world. Increased mobility and advancements in 
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communication technologies will continue to allow individuals and organizations to share 
grievances, insight anger, recruit followers, and act upon ideological grievances (Smith, 
Burke, de Leiuen, and Jackson, 2016). Such grievances are bolstered by political and 
social exclusion through poorly designed policies and ineffective government structures 
(Akram, and Karmely, 2005; Levine, Leenman, Gershenson, and Hureau, 2014; 
Oberman, 2017). 
Sharing the identified best practices and acknowledging potential opportunities 
for improvement assists other communities as they build resiliency and create their 
community response plans. Government leaders need the knowledge provided by 
nongovernmental experts and broad community engagement to create early intervention 
programs and establish effective terrorism response strategies.  
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Appendix A: Structured Survey Questions for Government Leaders 
1.) How and why has your organization collaborated with other government agencies 
or the local community to provide joint services? 
2.) How have domestic terrorism and the threat of future acts of terrorism influenced 
or changed how Oklahoma City provides for public safety and builds long-term 
community resiliency? 
3.) Do you feel that nongovernment organizations are appropriate for providing 
education, information, and advice to government leaders to address ideologically 
based security threats? Why? 
4.) How has collaboration between government and nongovernment agencies 
influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural and multi-
lingual needs? 
5.) What have city government officials done to develop strategic plans for 
responding to and recovering from terrorist threats or terrorist activities? 
6.) What has been the level of collaboration across or within government agencies to 
develop strategic plans and maintain community resiliency in response to terrorist 
threats or activities in their communities? 
7.) What has been the level of government collaboration with nongovernmental 
organizations, private businesses and community leaders to develop strategic 
plans and maintain community resiliency in response to terrorist threats or 
activities in their communities? 
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Appendix B: Structured Survey for Nongovernment Leaders 
1.) How and why has your organization collaborated with other government agencies 
or the local community to provide joint services? 
2.) How have domestic terrorism and the threat of future acts of terrorism influenced 
or changed how Oklahoma City provides for public safety and builds long-term 
community resiliency? 
3.) Do you feel that nongovernment organizations are appropriate for providing 
education, information, and advice to government leaders to address ideologically 
based security threats? Why? 
4.) How has collaboration between government and nongovernment agencies 
influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural and multi-
lingual needs? 
5.) What have nongovernment leaders done to assist with the development of 
strategic plans for responding to and recovering from terrorist threats or terrorist 
activities? 
6.) What has been the level of collaboration across or within nongovernment 
agencies to develop strategic plans and maintain community resiliency in response to 
terrorist threats or activities in their communities? 
7.) What has been the level of government collaboration with nongovernmental 
organizations, private businesses and community leaders to develop strategic plans 
and maintain community resiliency in response to terrorist threats or activities in their 
communities? 
